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THREE THINGS TO BE AGAINST

("SETTLEMENT" NOT INCLUDED)
Michael Moffitt*
INTRODUCTION

Owen Fiss chose a great title for his article, Against Settlement.'
Without even reading the associated article, most readers are provoked
into immediate sympathy or antipathy. 2 I blame (or credit) the word
"settlement." "Settlement" has a Rorschach quality, conjuring different
images and associations for different viewers. Perhaps we might even be
able to derive some understanding of a person's experiences and values
based on the meaning he or she makes of the idea of "settlement."
On one end of a definitional spectrum, we might imagine the reactions of
some of the people one scholar has labeled "litigation romanticists." 3 For
many with this thorough devotion to the ideals of litigation, the word
"settlement" has a distinctly negative set of implications. "Settlement" is
viewed as synonymous with "compromise," or even "selling out." To these
observers, the idea of being "against settlement" is thoroughly
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, James 0. and Alfred T. Goodwin Senior Faculty
Fellow, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director, Appropriate Dispute Resolution
Center, University of Oregon School of Law. For their helpful feedback on this essay, I
thank Jeff Seul, Amy Cohen, Jamie Henikoff Moffitt, and the students in the University of
Oregon's Master's Program in Conflict and Dispute Resolution. For their research
assistance, I thank Stefanie Herrington, Caitlin O'Donnell, Shaffer Claridge, and Ashley
Glassman.
1. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
2. I suspect that few readers of Against Settlement change their conclusions, in either
direction, upon reading the article. Still, I am not suggesting that Fiss's title fully captures
the complexity of the points he is making. People should read the actual article, regardless
of their initial reactions.
3. I believe Carrie Menkel-Meadow coined this phrase in 1994. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missingfrom the MacCrate
Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593, 606
n.58 (1994). Although they may not self-identify as such, I might place scholars like David
Luban, Laura Nader, and Stephen Yeazell in this category. See, e.g., David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (arguing that
settlement deprives the public of the litigation-driven articulation of public norms); Laura
Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement To Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993) (arguing
that settlement favors harmony over justice); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood
Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631 (arguing that settlement
erodes the justice system by decreasing appellate review opportunities).
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unremarkable. Of course one should be against settlement. Indeed, one can
imagine these folks wondering why this proposition merits placement in the
Yale Law Journal. What's next? An article entitled Against Corruption?
Or maybe Against Incompetence?
On the other end of a definitional spectrum, we might imagine the
reactions of some of the people who are so thoroughly devoted to the ideals
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that one could fairly label them
"ADR evangelists."' 4 For many with this view of the world, "settlement" is
an almost unquestioned positive. Their synonym for "settlement" would be
"agreement," or even "deal-making." To these observers, the idea of being
against settlement is astonishing. Indeed, one can imagine them similarly
questioning the wisdom of Yale Law Journal editors twenty-five years ago.
What's next? An article entitled Against Autonomy? Or maybe Against
Progress?
Many of the issues Owen Fiss raised in his article merit a more nuanced
examination than either of these views of "settlement" might initially
suggest. Both litigation and settlement are worthy of celebration, and both
5
are worthy of critical examination.
Litigation and settlement do not merely coexist. Instead, litigation and
settlement have come to depend on each other in order to function properly.
In the first Part of this essay, I briefly highlight some of the ways in which
modem litigation and modem settlement intersect. The rules of civil
procedure contemplate, and even encourage, settlement behavior at virtually

4. Robert A. Baruch Bush self-identified some years ago as being part of the
"mediation orthodoxy." I understand that to be essentially the same as the label I suggest.
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology:
An Imaginary Conversation,3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7 (1989). Kenneth Cloke might
fairly fall into this category as well. See KENNETH CLOKE, CONFLICT REVOLUTION:
MEDIATING EVIL, WAR, INJUSTICE AND TERRORISM-How MEDIATORS CAN HELP SAVE THE
PLANET (2008). Some misread Carrie Menkel-Meadow as being an alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) evangelist. She does strongly defend both the theory and practice of
settlement. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests of Justice" in the
Twenty-First Century: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1763 (2002)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Practicing]. Menkel-Meadow's support for settlement,
however, is more nuanced and conditional than some within the "settlement" community.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, For and Against Settlement]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the
Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 37 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, When LitigationIs Not the Only Way];
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?]. I agree with Baruch Bush, however, who
characterizes her instead as a member of the "process pluralists." Baruch Bush, supra at 7.
5. Many have made the point that litigation and settlement are independently
praiseworthy, and praiseworthy in tandem. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a Dispute
Resolution Alternative, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 336, 336-57 (Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005); see also Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and
Functions, 44 S.CAL. L. REV. 305, 307 (1971) (arguing that we should "appraise the relative
aptness, for solving a given problem, of the various competing forms of social ordering").
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every stage of litigation. Similarly, the prospect of litigation today shapes
both settlement outcomes and settlement behaviors. I am not convinced,
therefore, that it is possible to be wholly "for" one and "against" the other,
given these intersections.
In the second Part of my essay, I cautiously suggest that observers from
all camps might endorse at least three of the fundamental principles Owen
Fiss highlighted in his article. Ideal processes (1) deal appropriately with
power imbalances, (2) minimize agency costs, and (3) ensure meaningful
access to courts. Processes that consistently fail to protect these ideals
6
deserve robust opposition.
In the final Part, I suggest three enduring questions applicable both to the
target of Fiss's wrath--settlement-and to the target of his apparent
devotion-litigation. 7 First, are litigation and settlement living up to the
ideals each would name as among its core values or functions? Litigation
looks different today than it did when Against Settlement first appeared. So
does settlement. We might reasonably wonder whether either of these
processes is closing the gap between its ideals and the reality of its
implementation.
Second, are advocates for litigation and settlement
articulating the values-and the limitations-of each process accurately?
And third, what lessons would the last twenty-five years offer to legal
educators about what students should learn about litigation and about
settlement?
Settlement-like litigation-has the potential to contribute far more than
the mere resolution of disputes. Settlement-like litigation-also has the
potential to undermine fundamental public and private interests. It is not
"settlement" we should be against.
I. FOR SETTLEMENT AND FOR LITIGATION

Both the title and the tenor of Fiss's Against Settlement invite a critical
response framed in absolute terms-perhaps something in the nature of
Against 'Against Settlement.' Others have parsed his arguments and have
offered comprehensive, direct rejoinders to his theses. 8 If one had to
6. As I note in Part II, however, in practice, even when measured against these
fundamental criteria, both litigation and settlement currently fall short of their promises and
ideals.
7. In his article, Fiss described "adjudication" rather than "litigation" as the object of
his praise. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1085. With developments in modem arbitration over the
past two and a half decades, I suspect that Fiss would agree that "adjudication" is overly
broad, as his focus appears to be rooted in an assumption that adjudication is a state function.
Arbitration is undoubtedly adjudicatory, and is undoubtedly guilty of many of the sins Fiss
ascribes to settlement, because of its private nature. See infra Part II.C for more on
arbitration's place in Fiss's analysis. See also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 353-54 (1978) (suggesting a broad range of public and
private functions that qualify as "adjudication").
8. For examples of direct rejoinders to Fiss, see Baruch Bush, supra note 4; Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985); MenkelMeadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4; Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant

Cases, 79 WASH. L. REv. 881 (2004).
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choose a single winner in a fictional scholarly cage match on the question
of the persuasiveness of Against Settlement, I am not sure that Fiss would
emerge victorious. This is particularly true if one reads Against Settlement
to be suggesting that litigation is always more worthy of praise than
settlement. 9 Mercifully, we need not choose. Whether Fiss is, on balance,
more persuasive than his critics is not the right question.
Similarly, whether litigation or settlement is, on balance, more valuable
is also not the right question. We need not choose between them in an
artificially binary way. Both litigation and settlement have values and
functions worthy of celebration. Both also have significant flaws and
shortcomings in their ideals and in their implementation. Critical observers
can point to enough of these shortcomings that it would not be difficult to
10
write an article along the lines of Against Settlement and Litigation.
Without discounting the practical limitations each process presents, I
nevertheless find myself on the opposite comer of a for/against grid. I am,
at the end of the day, For Settlement and Litigation.
Treating litigation and settlement as though they were entirely distinct
processes is, of course, an oversimplification. In practice, the two are
intertwined. I I The fundamental rules and structure of each clearly
acknowledge the importance of the other. Modem civil procedure is
structured to facilitate the interaction between litigation and settlement. For
example, many court systems require, as part of the routine cadence of
litigation, consultation with opposing parties for the purpose of exploring
settlement. 12 Many rules make discussions of settlement an explicit part of

9. One could read Fiss's article as making a less sweeping condemnation of settlement
and its relative merits, as compared with litigation. Doing so, I believe, attributes nuance to
Fiss's argument that I do not believe is found in the text of Against Settlement. Against
Settlement is a polemic. That the polemic could have been written differently does not
change how it was actually written. But see Amy Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement:
Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143
(2009) (suggesting that Fiss's Against Settlement might be read as political, provisional, and
contextual, rather than absolute).
10. Amy Cohen has demonstrated an intriguing alternative possibility-that one could
read Against Settlement as neither really against settlement nor for adjudication, but rather as
Against Neoliberalism. See Cohen, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation To Teach About Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984). This dichotomy also mistakenly implies that these
are the only two processes available to disputants. See Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?, supra note 4, at 2666.
12. Such requirements appear both at the pleadings stage and during discovery. See, e.g.,
D. CONN. LOCAL Civ. R. 16(c)(1) ("A mandatory settlement conference will be held at or
shortly after the close of discovery. Counsel have a duty to discuss the possibility of
settlement during the planning conference required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(o and Local Rule
16 and may request that an early settlement conference be conducted before the parties
undertake significant discovery or motion practice."); S.C. R. Civ. P. 1l(a) ("All motions
filed shall contain an affirmation that the movant's counsel prior to filing the motion has
communicated, orally or in writing, with opposing counsel and has attempted in good faith to
resolve the matter contained in the motion, unless the movant's counsel certifies that
consultation would serve no useful purpose, or could not be timely held.").
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judicial conferences. 13 Civil procedure rules specifically contemplate
stipulated dismissals, 14 the entry and reopening of consent decrees, 15 and
procedures for judicial involvement in privately bargained class action
settlements. 16 Rules of evidence specifically protect statements made
during settlement discussions. 17 Even after a judgment is entered, many
court systems now employ a number of strategies for promoting settlement
at the appellate level. 18 Modem litigation, in other words, takes place in
concert with the ongoing prospect of settlement.
Similarly, settlement takes place within the confines of the parameters
established by the prospect of litigation. Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Komhauser suggested years ago that disputants "bargain in the shadow of
the law."' 9 I am not convinced, as an empirical matter, that assessments of
legal entitlements always drive disputants' settlement behavior. 20 But
certainly, in at least many cases, disputants compare what they might
receive through a settlement with what they expect might happen in
litigation. Furthermore, each disputant's settlement behavior is bounded by
the prospect of postsettlement litigation. 2 1 In this manner, private law
concepts like fraud, unconscionability, and duress affect negotiators'
behaviors precisely because litigation exists as a possible adjunct to
settlement negotiations. 22 The prospect of litigation shapes settlement
behaviors and settlement outcomes.
13. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16(a)(5) ("In any action, the court may order the attorneys
and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such
purposes as... facilitating settlement.").
14. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (permitting voluntary dismissals upon "a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared").
15. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (permitting relief from an order if "the judgment
has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable").
16. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (court must approve of terms before a class action
"may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised").
17. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408 (excluding evidence of "conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations").
18. See, e.g., Robert B. Moberly & Laura E. Levine, The New Arkansas AppellateMediation Program,61 ARK. L. REV. 429 (2008); Ignazio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation"Settling" the Last Frontier of ADR, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177 (2005); Kathleen M.
Scanlon, A Casefor JudicialAccountability: When Courts Add a Settlement Detour to the
TraditionalAppellate "Path," 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 379 (2002).
19. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DISPUTES 40-81 (1991) (showing, in an empirical study, that trespass and boundary disputes
among farmers and ranchers are resolved without reference to legal entitlements); Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (showing, in an empirical study, that settlements in
fraud cases bear no relationship to the legal merits of the underlying claims).
21. For a survey of the legal boundaries surrounding negotiators' misbehavior in
bargaining, see MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 19-49 (2008).
22. Of course, some negotiators "behave" because they are motivated by norms beyond
rationalistic risk-benefit calculations. Many even may "behave" because they perceive self-
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Despite these obvious interconnections (some might say, with disfavor,
"these entanglements"), the archetypal litigation and the archetypal
settlement represent fundamentally different processes. And for purposes
of simplicity in this essay, I consider them separately. Still, I suspect that
modem litigation and modem settlement have coevolved into what
biologists might call a mutually obligate symbiotic relationship-neither
can function properly without the other.
A. What Litigation Gives to Settlement
Litigation has certain features that are often missing from settlement. In
this Part, I highlight two examples of these features-law articulation and
law enforcement-because modem settlement depends on both of these in
order to function properly.
Within our common-law system, the court's role in articulating the law
has an obvious contribution to settlement dynamics. Put most simply,
courts clarify legal rules not only for the disputants in one case, but also for
23
other disputants or prospective disputants who may be similarly situated.
Whether courts consistently perform a law-clarifying function in practice is
debatable. As David Luban has observed, we have such a proliferation of
written judicial opinions that one is almost certain to find at least some
support for almost any legal proposition. 24 In a state of judicial Babel,
adding more judicial voices hinders the goal of clarity. And yet, at least as
a theoretical matter, litigation is the mechanism that drives the courts to
articulate the boundaries of the law.
The fact that disputants have access to information about the boundaries
of the law affects settlements. A few economists have suggested that clear
legal entitlements may make settlement less likely than a condition of
greater uncertainty. But this perspective has not gained prominence among
dispute resolution scholars or, if my anecdotal experience is any indication,
among practitioners. I have yet to encounter any mediation parties who
bemoan the existence of relevant, controlling authority. Nor have I found
disputants mutually joining to celebrate the ambiguity in a legal principle.
Instead, my experience with most disputants2 5 is that they acknowledge
interested benefit as a result of doing so. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering
the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV.

Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on

NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002). But at least some negotiators would likely engage in
negotiations differently if there were no threat of legal repercussions.
23. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979) ("A court system (public or private) produces two types of
service. One is dispute resolution-determining whether a rule has been violated. The other
is rule formation-creating rules of law as a by-product of the dispute-settlement process.").
24. Luban, supra note 3, at 2642-46.
25. The only place I have seen evidence to the contrary has been with disputes of minor
monetary value. In small claims court, on occasion, I did sometimes observe parties
mutually acknowledge the unpredictability of the presiding magistrate and then proceed to
settle. It is not clear to me that it was ambiguity in the law, as opposed to ambiguity in the
likelihood that the law as written would be applied, that drove this behavior.
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some ambiguity in the legal entitlements they bring to the table, but
nonetheless use their understanding of expected court outcomes to provide
at least some parameters within which to consider different settlements.
The existence of litigation makes this process of establishing boundaries
easier.
The other feature of litigation that has a profoundly supportive effect on
settlement is the fact that courts have the ability to enforce their decisions.
The assumption that courts' decisions will necessarily take effect is a given
only to those whose experience is limited to relatively recent domestic
litigation. Those of us who have worked internationally know that in many
countries, it is far from obvious that a court's decision will translate into
action on the ground. Indeed, not so long ago, it was an open question
whether an unpopular court order would take effect in the United States.
The compelling images of National Guard troops in Little Rock, Arkansas,
helping to enforce the decision to desegregate schools are often rightly used
to illustrate the triumph of law and justice. One might also reasonably use
those images as a reminder of the fragile dependence of law and justice on
implementation.
Litigation's promise includes the promise of
26
implementation.
This promise of enforcement affects-and largely supports-settlement
in at least two ways. The first, and probably most conspicuous, way is that
courts can be called upon to give effect to settlement agreements. In the
event disputants decide voluntarily to resolve a matter, and subsequently
one disputant reneges on the terms of that agreement, courts are available to
give effect to the private settlement. 27 If the two neighbors Fiss describes
as in a boundary dispute cannot count on courts for enforcement, the
neighbors would be inclined neither toward litigation nor toward private
settlement in its traditional forms, 2 8 because neither of those would be able
to guarantee compliance. It is the prospect of enforcement that offers both
the justice and peace from either private settlement or public adjudication of
the neighbors' dispute.
Enforcement has an even bigger impact on the large-scale cases Fiss
might label as "significant." Consider a mass tort, a widespread consumer
26. Some have suggested that our courts continue to lack complete enforcement abilities,
and that this incomplete authority is a product of intentional constitutional design. See, e.g.,
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE

21-22 (1991) (describing the "constrained" view of courts, in contrast to the "dynamic" view
of courts embraced by many who view the courts as having been central to the civil rights
reforms of the 1960s).

27. The precise mechanism for giving effect to the settlement's terms will depend on the
nature of the case, of course. The aggrieved party may need to assert that the agreement, as
a contract, was breached and should be enforced. Alternatively, in many circumstances,
settlement agreements are entered as orders of the court, for example, as consent decrees,
and can be more readily enforced as one would any noncompliance with a judicial order.
28. The parties could contemplate noncontractual, self-enforcing mechanisms that would
not depend on courts' enforcement mechanisms. These could include everything from selfexecuting bonds to vigilantism. But the traditional means of settlement-private contractdoes depend on courts.
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fraud case, or an institutional reform action. Now consider how unlikely
either the plaintiffs or the defendants would be to contemplate voluntary
settlement in any of those cases if the court were unable to guarantee that
the terms of the settlement would take effect. Without the court's power to
enforce contracts, without consent decrees, and without the preclusion
doctrines, neither side in any significant case would see an incentive to
29
settle.
The second way the prospect of litigation shapes settlement stems from
its effect on the way in which settlement negotiations take place. Courts
are available, through litigation, to hear postsettlement complaints about
any bargaining misbehavior that took place on the road to settlement. If
courts were not available to hear such complaints, I strongly suspect that we
would encounter more bargaining misbehavior, more expensive bargaining,
or both. If negotiators perceive no threat that misbehavior carries a risk of
court-ordered rescission or sanction, would they nonetheless refrain from
fraud, coercion, and the like? Although the prospect of judicial scrutiny is
not the only thing 30 standing between us and a Hobbesian, Wild West
version of settlement negotiations, it certainly helps.
Settlement works today, in part, because courts articulate legal rules,
establish at least some clarity around legal entitlements, enforce private
settlements, and stand ready to audit settlement behavior after an agreement
is reached.
B. What Settlement Gives to Litigation
Just as settlement benefits from certain features of modem litigation,
litigation benefits from certain features of modem settlement. To illustrate
this point, I highlight below two of the things settlement offers to litigation:
docket clearance and selective case filtering.
The most conspicuous of settlement's contributions to modem litigation
is its capacity to reduce the number of cases demanding judicial resources
and attention. Fiss appears to imagine that docket lightening is, in fact,
settlement's only contribution to our judicial system. Likening settlement
to plea bargaining, he declares both of them to be undeserving of praise. At
best, he says, they are realities that must be suffered under the constraints of
current conditions. 3 1 It is not my intention to weigh into the conversation
about the morality of plea bargaining, although I may be more sympathetic
29. In the most simplistic case, plaintiffs would rely on these mechanisms to assure
enforcement of whatever agreement was reached in the settlement, and defendants would
rely on the preclusion doctrines to protect against uncertain additional exposure on the same
matter.
30. Parties could, of course, devise mechanisms for protecting themselves privately
against the most egregious forms of bargaining misbehavior. They could post various forms
of private bonds, take hostages, create reputational sanctions, and so on. But doing so would

make the bargaining process considerably more costly than it is today, with no real
corresponding benefit.
31. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1075.
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to its functioning than Fiss. Instead, I acknowledge at least part of Fiss's
point:
settlement permits courts to function properly because of
32
settlement's docket-management function.
Settlement is not the only way to reduce a court's caseload, of course.
We could have higher filing fees. 33 We could make pleading standards
more stringent. 34 We could have shorter statutes of limitation, 35 have fewer
opportunities for discovery, 36 grant more dispositive motions, 37 or change
fee allocation rules. 38 A pair of prominent economists even recently
suggested that we consider simply dismissing some percentage of cases at
random. 39 The problem with each of these suggestions for docket
reduction, however, is that they risk filtering out the "wrong" cases.
Settlement offers at least the prospect of filtering out the "right" cases.
Of course, one might argue that settlements are, by the virtue of party
autonomy, the "right" cases, by some simplistic definition. By this logic,
unless some form of coercion or other improper influence operates on
disputants, causing them to settle, a private settlement is evidence that the
32. Some, like Carrie Menkel-Meadow, have argued that settlement, "both by its
increased use of publicity in important cases, and its ability to remove some cases from the
system, might actually improve the quality of public discourse or lawmaking in the public
realm, more broadly conceived of, than in traditional adjudication." Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4, at 2682.
33. Richard Posner has suggested two choices for courts facing an increasing demand
for their services: increase fees or tolerate greater delays. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 124-34 (1996). But see Diana Gribbon Motz,

A FederalJudge's View of RichardA. Posner's The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1029, 1039 (1998) (book review) ("Although Judge Posner may be
right that sharply increased filing fees would marginally decrease the federal caseload and
increase the quality of judging, the message that such fees would send must also be
considered. It is a message I find inconsistent with the principles upon which this country
was founded and which should remain a hallmark of our system of justice.").
34. Some have expressed concern that we may be on this path already, even in the
absence of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) amendments, with the recent Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcrofi v. Iqbal decisions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal; 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
35. Shorter medical malpractice statutes of limitation were a component in "tort reform"
legislation in virtually every state. See R. Patrick Bedell, The Next Frontierin Tort Reform:
Promotingthe FinancialSolvency of Nursing Homes, 11 ELDER L.J. 361, 384 (2003).
36. Since the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, there have been periodic calls for discovery
reforms. For a useful history, see Lisa J. Trembly, Mandatory Disclosure: A Historical
Review of the Adoption of Rule 26 and an Examination of the Events That Have Transpired
Since Its Adoption, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 425 (1997).

37. Some have even gone so far as to propose mandatory summary judgment. See Randy
J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory
Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004).
38. Revoking statutory exceptions to the American Rule would surely have the effect of
decreasing litigation in certain areas. For examples of statutory exceptions, see 15 U.S.C. §
26 (2006) (antitrust); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (civil rights).
39. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal To Halve Litigation
Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005) (proposing that courts "select randomly for
litigation only half the cases brought before them" but then award double damages in any
cases that did proceed). I suspect that proposals such as these will do little to quell the
persistent criticism that law professors spend too much of their time divorced from the real
world.
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parties judged their consensual option superior to the prospects of
litigation. 40 In this mercenarily individual-rationality sense, at least, settled
cases were the "right" ones to settle, and those that do not settle were the
"right" ones to litigate. But Fiss's objection is not that all parties would
prefer litigation and that many are somehow being prevented from
litigating. His argument is that adjudication is superior when viewed from a
societal level. The suggestion that the disputants in question might prefer to
settle is, apparently, of little interest to Fiss.
But my point here is not about satisfying parties' interests. Instead my
point is that litigation fulfills its public function best if it is not called upon
as the method of resolving every kind of dispute. It is not that litigation
cannot resolve every type of dispute. Virtually anything can be shoehorned
into a generic set of procedures in a court system of general jurisdiction.
Anything that cannot be made to fit, we can declare not to have been a
legitimate lawsuit anyway. And anything that does fit, no matter how
awkwardly, we can deem to have been appropriately handled by the courts
as evidenced by its eventual judicial disposition. But there are some kinds
of disputes for which litigation is not particularly well suited, and if
litigation need not contend with these disputes, it can do a better job of
addressing the ones for which it is well designed.
Three different features of settlement make this selective filtering process
possible. First, settlement offers the prospect of value creation. Litigation
is necessarily backward looking, focused on binary entitlements, and
framed in win/lose terms. Courts allocate or reallocate resources in a zerosum manner. But in at least some disputes, the possible solution set is
broader than the litigation model suggests. More than merely splitting the
difference between probabilistically adjusted expected values, settlement
outcomes can make parties better off, individually and in the aggregate.
Private disputants frequently discover these opportunities.
Intellectual
property disputes, for example, routinely culminate not in litigation, but
rather in licenses or cross-licenses. Companies in disputes over the terms of
supply contracts routinely renegotiate and extend contract terms. Divorcing
couples routinely allocate child support and alimony in ways that minimize
tax implications. Employees routinely return to work for employers with
whom they have been in disputes. Private disputants often find ways to
convert disputes into deal-making opportunities in which the total benefit
41
for all parties is greater than could be achieved in litigation.
40. We must remain vigilant, of course, that the "consent" imagined in the ideal forms of
private resolution is, in fact, reflected in practice. In at least some contexts, there is reason
for concern. See, e.g., Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective SelfRepresentation in Negotiation, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85 (1996); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley,
Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (2009); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning
Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 1 (2001).
41. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATrON, GETrING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 70-77 (2d ed. 1991); DAVID A. LAX & JAMES
K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 88-116 (1986).

2009]

THREE THINGS TO BE A GAINST

1213

Disputes involving the government present these opportunities for value
creation as well. For example, an electro-pop band called The Postal
Service recently found itself faced with a cease-and-desist letter from the
U.S. Postal Service, which claimed trademark infringement. Rather than
litigate the infringement issue, the band and the government entered a
license agreement, under which the band kept its name and agreed to
promote use of the U.S. Postal Service among its fan base-a demographic
with which the government was particularly interested in making inroads.
The band also agreed to perform at an annual U.S. Postal Service event. 42
For more serious, or at least perhaps less generationally specific examples,
consider how certain categories of land use disputes between developers
and local governments are routinely resolved using creative, customized,
"cash-free" settlement terms, including "transferred development rights,
land swaps, and consent decrees. ' 43 In some circumstances in which the
government is predictably involved in a stream of cases, the search for
creative or customized settlements has even been institutionalized. In the
context of special education disputes, for example, the 1997 reauthorization
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires mediation as an
option for resolving disputes between parents of special needs children and
school districts. 44 As their name suggests, the individualized education
plans that routinely emerge from such meetings reflect highly customized
agreements about the services the state will provide to the child in
45
question.
It may be that Fiss would exclude these opportunities for value creation
as not constituting "settlements," because they do not necessarily represent
compromises of either party's interests. But to dismiss these cases from the
relevant universe on this basis ignores the single most important concept in
modern dispute resolution literature-the idea that agreeing to an outcome
at odds with one's position is not the same as compromising one's
interests. 4 6 Litigation need not resolve some of these cases in which a
42. See Robert C. Bordone & Michael L. Moffitt, Create Value out of Conflict,
NEGOTIATION, June 2006, at 3; see also Fred Locklear, The Postal Service Delivers, and

Now Rocks, ARS TECHNICA,

Nov. 6,

2004, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2004/

11/4376.ars.
43. See Kenneth R. Kupchak et al., Arrow of Time: Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and

Development Agreements in Hawai'i, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 17, 62-63 (2004) ("These tools
can be an effective means of giving all parties that which they desire: return on investment
for the owner; cash-free solutions for the politicians; and public benefits for the taxpayers.").
44. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006)).

45. See generally Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real
Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19

OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 573 (2004) (studying special education mediation participants).
For an account of special education mediations in circumstances demanding extraordinary
customization, see Paul M. Secunda, Mediating the Special Education Front Lines in

Mississippi, 76 UMKC L. REV. 823 (2008) (special education needs of incarcerated
children).
46. The text most commonly credited with popularizing this understanding is Roger
Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton's GETTING TO YES, supra note 41. Len Riskin has
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binary decision would waste conspicuous opportunities for mutual benefit
because settlement selectively filters these cases from the docket.
Second, settlement offers the prospect of addressing nonfinancial, and
even nonlegal, issues. Being in a dispute is an emotional experience. Some
economists' portrayal of strategic litigation analysis notwithstanding, I have
yet to encounter an actual human being on either side of a legal dispute in
which he or she viewed the matter with clinical detachment. 47 Having an
emotional reaction to the dispute does not necessarily counsel for or against
litigation. In some cases, parties welcome litigation's promise of a binary
decision rendered by an emotion-free judge. In other cases, however,
people need more, or at least something different. What might a family
with divorcing parents need? What might labor and management leaders
need as they contemplate the terms of the contract that may end the current
strike? What might grieving family members need during the distribution
of an estate? What might two business partners in a dispute need? In many
contexts, parties must, or at least should, maintain their ability to work
together, regardless of the outcome of the particular extant dispute.
Litigation operates within an adversarial structure, and whatever else we
might say about it, litigation is not well suited for relationship building.
Settlement can help to filter some of these cases in which emotional
concerns or relationship interests coexist with--or even overshadowlegally cognizable interests, and, as a result, litigation can reasonably
called this "the most important and useful idea in the field." Leonard L. Riskin, Eleven Big
Ideas About Conflict: A Superficial Guide for the Thoughtful Journalist, 2007 J. DisP.
RESOL. 157, 161; see also Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4, at
2672 (explaining that "settlement is not necessarily unprincipled compromise"). Parties to
litigation have impliedly agreed to abide by the court's eventual decision. One could say
that in so doing, they have impliedly placed their interests in social stability above whatever

other interests they may have in the immediate dispute. See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing
Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 27, 32 (2002) ("The disputants' willingness to submit their dispute to adjudication by
a recognized tribunal is itself an affirmation of community, far more so than the self-help
remedies of the blood feud, duel, or riot."); Seul, supra note 8, at 900 ("The parties' choice
among available means for addressing their dispute suggests they implicitly recognize that
they, and the court before which they have brought their dispute, are participants in a larger
social system that, overall, is worth maintaining and attempting to enhance. The disputants,
like the rest of us, inhabit a social context in which many of their other cherished values are
aligned, even though those that are the subject of their current dispute are not."); Martin
Shapiro, Compromise and Litigation, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 163,
168-69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979).
47. Cognitive and social psychology, psychiatry, and psychotherapy have much to offer
our understanding of disputants. And none of those disciplines suggests that perfect
rationality is possible, much less the norm in the context of disputes. See, e.g., E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); LEIGH L.
THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (3d ed. 2008); Max H. Bazerman &
Katie Shonk, The Decision Perspective to Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 52, 52-65; Melissa L. Nelken, Negotiation and
Psychoanalysis: If I'd Wanted To Learn About Feelings, I Wouldn't Have Gone to Law
School, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 420 (1996); Daniel Shapiro, Enemies, Allies, and Emotions: The
Power of Positive Emotions in Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra note 5, at 66, 66-82.
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concern itself more exclusively to the narrow purpose for which it is
48
crafted.
Third, settlement offers the prospect of more fluid problem definition
than litigation. Many of the most challenging and important cases of the
modem world are ones in which litigation's rigid, and often narrow, joinder
and standing rules risk excluding people who will be fundamentally
affected by the case's outcome. I do not suggest that joinder and standing
rules are necessarily too restrictive. Instead, I merely point out that these
rules exist in their current form because they focus on the prospect of
litigation. They are, to state the obvious, rules of litigation. Not everyone
can, or should, be at the litigation table. But we should acknowledge the
cost of excluding people from the table.
Those without a voice in the process by which a dispute will be resolved
stand at risk.49 Yet litigation rules frequently exclude interested parties and
even their representatives from the room. Whether a party has a right to be
involved turns on the question of how one draws boundaries around a
dispute. Who should be involved in a case adjudicating the water rights for
the Snake River? Who should be involved in a case regarding threats to the
Spotted Owl's habitat? Who should be involved in a series of claims
involving tensions between a city's police force, its African-American
citizens, and its Latino citizens? 50 Litigation offers an answer to each of
these questions that is legally correct, but contextually dangerous, as it
excludes legitimately interested people. One of settlement's contributions
is that it can ask, "Who should be at the table?" and offer a more inclusive

48. Carrie Menkel-Meadow correctly suggests that "'appropriate dispute resolution'
allows parties to choose how they want their dispute resolved." Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4, at 2689-90; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now
a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality, and the Practice of Justice and Conflict
Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1073, 1083 (2001) ("ADR or conflict resolution practices
acknowledge a greater human variability of action than do the ritualized or overly stylized
forms of litigation practice. This allows values other than being 'right' to be imagined and
enacted. Portia's plea for mercy or forgiveness, the granting of an apology and human
acknowledgment of wrongfulness, if not legal fault or blame, all allow the fuller expression
of a richer gamut of human actions, emotions, and feelings and we hope, a more humane set
of responses." (footnotes omitted)).
49. This basic idea appears not only in literature principally focused on the law, but also
in descriptions of democratic discourse and procedural justice. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER &
YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE
AND COURTS 87 (2002) (presenting empirical support for the idea that "people focus more
directly on whether they have an opportunity to present their arguments than they do on
whether they think they are influencing the decisions made"); James Bohman, Complexity,
Pluralism,and the ConstitutionalState: On Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung, 28 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 897, 917 (1994) (describing a deliberative democracy as one in which "'All
members must be able to take part in discourse, even if not necessarily in the same way"'
(quoting JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 224 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992))).

50. For a description of a nonlitigation approach to answering this question, see Robert
Ricigliano et al., Problems Without a Process: Using an Action Dialogue To Manage Racial
Tensions, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 83 (1999) (describing the use of "action dialogue" to help
a city and its communities address widespread racial tensions).
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answer than litigation. When that occurs and a more comprehensive
settlement ensues, 5 1 litigation is improved because it can proceed with cases
in which the risk of de facto exclusion is less serious.
C. Future Coevolution Opportunitiesfor Litigation and Settlement?
Litigation and settlement have coevolved into their current forms. I feel
safe in asserting that neither has reached the apex of its evolutionary
process. Each will continue to change, and not all of the changes will
ultimately be judged to have been improvements.
The difficult question is not whether litigation and settlement will
continue to change-they will. The difficult question is how each will
change. In this final Part, I suggest two possible ways in which litigation
and settlement may continue their coevolution.
One aspect of modem litigation and settlement that may present an
opportunity for future evolution relates to pleadings. To the extent that
modem litigation has a triggering event-a moment at which it "begins"that moment revolves around pleadings. We continue to see considerable
litigation over just what modem litigation rules require litigants to include
in their pleadings. 52 But pleadings represent an area of litigation that has
remained relatively untouched by the prominence of settlement in modem
litigation. Pleadings' content requirements fly in the face of virtually all of
the prescriptions about how to assure an efficient and wise settlement.
Pleadings explore the past, rather than the future. Pleadings assume a
limited solution set. Pleadings favor formulaic recitations and preclude
expansive problem definitions. As I wrote in an article entitled Pleadings
in the Age of Settlement,
The process of drafting and receiving initial pleadings invites disputants

to frame disputes as binary clashes, to conceive of past events in absolute
terms, to base solutions solely on entitlements stemming from prior
events, and to filter out as irrelevant a vast
body of information related to
53
the circumstances underlying the dispute.
Pleadings, in short, contemplate only litigation, even though trials on the
merits represent the method by which only a small fraction of cases are
resolved.
In what ways might pleading rules evolve to reflect settlement's role
more helpfully? At least two possibilities emerge. First, if pleading rules
require information that is unhelpful, or if pleading rules preclude
information that would be helpful in an initial exchange, perhaps the
51. For an extensive treatment of consensus building dialogues, their inclusive nature,
and the durable agreements they produce, see THE CONSENsus BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKeaman

& Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
52. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
53. Michael Moffitt, Pleadingsin the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 737 (2005).
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content of pleading rules will change. 54 Len Riskin and Nancy Welsh, for
example, have suggested that courts ought to engage actively with
disputants to work or rework their conceptions of the problem(s) they are
bringing to litigation. A second possible change to pleading rules would
target not their content but, rather, their timing. Perhaps pleading rules are
just fine as they exist, but they happen at the wrong time. What if courts
required disputants to engage in settlement conversations, or some other
kind of exchange, prior to filing pleadings? The aspects of pleadings
required for the functioning of modem litigation are not so time sensitive
that the litigation cadence would be meaningfully disrupted. And there
would be at least some chance that disputants' perceptions of potential
settlement options would not be skewed by pleading rules structured for
other purposes. Pleading rules have undergone fundamental changes a
number of times in modem memory. Perhaps more changes are on the way.
A second possible aspect of litigation and settlement that may present an
opportunity for experimentation and evolution is the way in which modem
litigation's rules are treated as nonnegotiable, inflexible, and beyond the
control of disputants.
Henry Ford once said, in reference to his Model T automobiles, "Any
customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is
black."
Our judiciary has unfortunately embraced Henry Ford's sense of
consumer choice. Courts today essentially tell disputants that they can
have any
color of litigation they want, so long as it is the one that already
exists. 55
What if the rules of litigation were customizable or negotiable? In some
sense, arbitration's ascendancy suggests that disputants have an interest in
structuring at least some aspects of the adjudication in which they will
participate. But arbitration takes prospective litigants and makes them
parties to arbitration, no longer litigants. It diverts disputants from
litigation in the court. What if, within constitutional and statutory
constraints, disputants could remain within the realm of litigation, while
also customizing their experience? What might they do differently with
joinder, discovery, evidence, or appeals? Today's courts are not ideally
54. Len Riskin and Nancy Welsh have, for example, noted the disconnect between
pleading rules' relatively narrow problem-definition requirements and the broader problemdefinition that is often possible--and preferable. They even describe the active role some
judges in the Netherlands take on with respect to problem-definition during the cadence of
litigation. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem"
in Court-OrientedMediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 929-30 (2008) ("Dutch judges,
who may meet with the parties and lawyers several times to investigate and attempt to
resolve the case, are taught to ask, 'Will my decision solve your problem?"').
55. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Casefor Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 461, 462 (2007) (quoting HENRY FORD, My LIFE AND

WORK 72 (1922)); see also Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts
To Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration'sImage, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579

(2007); Elizabeth Thomburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 181.
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designed for every possible dispute, every possible configuration of
disputants, every possible clash of principles and rights. No court system
could be. Our litigation system is designed well for certain kinds of
disputes, and less well for others. Perhaps litigation will evolve in a way
that maintains its public character, while providing greater private influence
over the details of how litigation unfolds.
Again, I do not suggest that either of these adaptations is necessarily
going to occur. And I certainly do not suggest that these are the only two
ways in which litigation and settlement might evolve. But I am confident
that these and other similar considerations will continue to press both
litigation and settlement to refine their coexistence.
II. THINGS To BE AGAINST
Owen Fiss invited his readers to join him in opposition to "settlement."
As I explain in the first Part of this essay, I am not convinced that
settlement merits such summary or wholesale rejection. Indeed, I find
many aspects of settlement fundamentally valuable-perhaps even critical
to the success of our ongoing human experiment in living under the rule of
law.
Still, there is something seductive about naming the things for which one
does not stand. In that spirit, therefore, in the Part that follows, I offer a list
of three things worthy of opposition. To be clear, this list is not exhaustive
from my perspective. I am also against, inter alia, illiteracy, malnutrition,
and the New York Yankees.
The three things I list below are inspired by the central concerns I
understand to have motivated Fiss's declaration that he is against
settlement. Each describes an aspect of a regrettable present reality. Each
also presents a frame through which to observe not only settlement, but also
litigation. None of them, however, presents a basis for opposing settlement.
A. Power Imbalances
Disputants do not always have identical "power," however one constructs
the concept of power. And in some circumstances, one disputant has vastly
more power than the other disputant. At some level, this is inevitable. No
mechanism exists for assuring that I will only commit torts against people
within my own tax bracket. We want large corporations to enter
commercial or employment relationships with individuals. We need the
government to engage with individuals, groups of people, and other
governments. As long as these kinds of interactions take place, we must
assume that disputes will arise. We must assume, therefore, that now and
forevermore, power imbalances will mark at least some disputes.
Not all power imbalances are worthy of opposition, of course. The law
creates entitlements. Those entitlements are, themselves, one source of
power. In fact, I'm not sure that any of us would want the law to play a
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power-balancing role in many circumstances. 56 We often want certain
people to have a surplus of power, at least when we want them to have itthat is, when the law provides them with a set of rights.
I have a friend whose wife was recently about to have their first child. A
public sector employee, my friend approached his boss and indicated that
he intended to take paternity leave a few months after the baby was born.
The conversation, as my friend tells the story, went something like this:
Boss:
Well, I don't know. Nobody in our office has ever taken
paternity leave. I'll have to think about it.
Friend:

What do you mean, "think about it"?

Boss:

Well, there are all sorts of complications, and I'm just
not sure it will make sense or be workable.

Friend:

State law says that I'm entitled to this.

Boss:

[Silence]

Friend:

My wife is a law professor.

Boss:

Oh. Um. OK. When were you thinking of starting your
paternity leave?

"Power" in this exchange was in no way balanced. On the one hand, the
state agency for whom my friend works has vastly more resources, and the
combination of impending fatherhood and a lousy economy made my
friend's alternatives unattractive. On the other hand, the relevant legal
entitlements tilted entirely in favor of my friend. And for purposes of this
conversation, at least, my friend had virtually all of the relevant power, not
merely some balance or share of the power.
Fiss might respond, "Right, but see? Even in the story you chose, it was
the barely veiled threat of litigation that caused the change in the otherwise
more powerful party's behavior. Litigation is the vehicle for assuring the
public value embodied by the paternity leave law." And I would not
disagree in the least, except to celebrate the existence of a

56. There may be some contexts in which we would actually have a policy preference
for power-however one defines that--to be relatively balanced, rather than tipping entirely
one way or the other. For example, labor laws frequently have as a policy goal the
preservation of industrial peace. This leads not only to the promotion of mediation and
arbitration, but also to the idea of a reasonable balance of power as a precursor to
collectively bargained contracts. In the context of election-related speech, as well, we might
have concerns if one party had such a surplus of power, in the form of resources that
translate to access to the public's ear, that it could effectively shut out other viewpoints. On
this latter point, see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1405,
1411-12 (1986) ("The risk posed to freedom of speech by autonomy ... occurs whenever

speech takes place under conditions of scarcity, that is, whenever the opportunity for
communication is limited."). I am grateful to my colleague Stuart Chinn for helping me to
understand this aspect of Fiss's understanding of power balancing.
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mechanism--settlement--that enabled my friend to enjoy his paternity
57
leave while his daughter was still an infant.
Or Fiss might respond, "I'm talking about disparities in resources. That's
the power imbalance that is the real threat. '58 Clearly, resources matter,
regardless of the process in question. I would always prefer to be the one
with more resources. And yet, treating resources and power as coterminous
is problematic. By virtually every measure, the United States had more
resources than its enemies in Vietnam. The New York Yankees have set
payroll records each of the last eight seasons but have enjoyed less success
on the field than many teams with more limited resources. 59 Following the
story of Lysistrata, groups of women in several African countries have
recently launched initiatives to withhold sex from their partners until they
cease participating in wars. 60 In his thoughtful, and sometimes gutwrenching exploration of power dynamics in the context of divorce cases,
Scott Hughes suggests that "power is not monolithic; it can be divided into
61
five areas: economic, intellectual, physical, emotional, and procedural.
A meaningful understanding of power in virtually all contexts must be more
nuanced than just access to resources.
What Owen Fiss and others would have us pay attention to-and rightly
so-is the skewing effects these differences in resources can have on the
process(es) by which disputes are resolved. And neither settlement nor
litigation, in our current system, deals adequately with the problems posed
by this form of power imbalance.
In its idealized form, litigation provides protections aimed against having
outcomes determined by the resources of the disputants. A cash register
appears nowhere in the traditional image of blind justice, holding the scales
aloft, weighing the merits of each circumstance against the relevant law. In

57. I celebrate, also, that my friend could enjoy those rights without having to incur the
inevitable transaction costs associated with litigation-particularly because he would recover
few of those costs even if he were successful with his claim.
58. This was, in large measure, Fiss's first response when I posed this question at the
symposium from which this essay stems. Against Settlement presents a third possible
response: that Fiss would decry the settlement between my friend and his employer because
my friend got paternity leave without the public having been involved.
59. For a fascinating economic analysis of baseball teams' payroll efficiency, see Rich
Lederer, MLB Payroll Efficiency, 2006-2008, BASEBALL

ANALYSTS,

Mar. 2, 2009,

http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/03/20062008_payrol.php. See also David Sweet,
The 'Smart' Choice To Win the Series?
Tampa, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 8, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27089678 (reproducing the "cost-per-win index").
60. In Aristophanes's play, Lysistrata schemed with other women to withhold sex from
their husbands as a means of compelling them to end the Peloponnesian War.
ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA 24-25 (Douglas Parker trans., New American Library 1964)
(411 BC); see also BBC News, Would You Withhold Sex To Get Your Way?,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/8033695.stm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
61. Scott Hughes, Elizabeth's Story:
Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce
Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 574-75 (1995) (citing JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE
MEDIATION: A PRACTICE GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS 49 (198 1)).

2009]

THREE THINGS TO BE AGAINST

1221

modem litigation, the judges are professional and impartial. 62 Filing fees
represent a tiny fraction of the cost of administering the judicial function,
and courts are empowered to waive even these modest fees for parties
without adequate resources. 6 3 Pleadings, the gateway to accessing the
machinery of the court, aim to minimize formalism and complexity, in
favor of having issues resolved on their merits. 64 Many statutory claims
contain provisions that permit fee shifting in the event of successful
litigation, creating an incentive for attorneys to accept representation in
cases that would be financially unattractive absent these provisions. 65 Even
juries, whose makeup is consistently more representative of the population
as a whole than is the makeup of the bar or the bench, might be seen as
democratic protectors of those with fewer resources. 66 Litigation, in its
perfect form, dispenses justice without reference to disputants' resources.
These protections fail often enough, however, that we should not imagine
that litigation has "solved" the power imbalance problem. Much of the
action in modem litigation takes place in discovery-and therefore outside
of whatever protections a judge might practically provide to a litigant with
fewer resources. 67 The trend in courts appears to be toward more restrictive
62. Whether, as an empirical matter, judges live up to the commonly accepted ideal of
impartiality is a different matter. Judicial recusal mechanisms present the most obvious
safeguard against perceived or actual bias on the bench. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257-67 (2009) (requiring a state supreme court justice to recuse
himself from a case involving a party who had made $3 million in campaign contributions to
the judge). For a different theoretical view of the principle ofjudicial impartiality, see OFER
RABAN, MODERN LEGAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 83 (2003) ("[S]ome legal
Partiality . . . is sometimes
questions must be answered by the use of preferences.
unavoidable in perfectly valid legal determinations.").
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
64. This was Charles Clark's vision of how pleading rules would function when he
drafted the FRCP. We know this from both his scholarly work and from opinions he
authored once he became a judge. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d
Cir. 1944) (calling a 12(b)(6) motion "a mere formal motion"); Charles E. Clark, Simplified
Pleading,2 F.R.D. 456, 459 (1941) (suggesting that under the new pleading rules, "even a
child could write a letter to the court telling of its case"); Moffitt, supra note 53, at 768.
Cases like Twombly and Iqbal raise questions about whether Clark's vision remains in
practice.
65. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (antitrust); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (civil
rights).
66. See, e.g., ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 52-65 (2001); Stephan
Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 974 (2004) (expressing the de Tocqueville observation that
juries are "political institution[s]," placing "the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed," with juries as "the whole community's spokesman" (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 291 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945)
(1835))).
67. The structure of modern discovery rules rests on the idea that full disclosure of
information leads to greater justice. See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (stating that discovery "make[s] a trial less a game of blind man's buff
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent"); Alexander Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 576, 577 (1954) ("[T]he purpose of litigation is not to conduct a contest or to oversee a
game of skill, but to do justice as between the parties and to decide controversies on their
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access to juries, whether by heightened pleading standards 68 or more
expansive summary judgment practice. 6 9 The funding for legal aid
70
lawyering has been reduced, restricted, and in some cases eliminated.
The financial incentives for private lawyers to take on these cases has not
fundamentally changed the fact that pro se navigation of the court system is
the only option many poor would-be litigants see for themselves. In short,
no reasonable observer would suggest that a disputant's resources are
actually irrelevant to the outcome that disputant can expect to get in court.
In its idealized form, private settlement occurs without the influence of
power imbalances. A significant portion of the law of contracts aims to
protect against the injustices that would arise from enforcing agreements
struck under inappropriate conditions. The law of duress targets contexts in
which one party to a contract entered the contract without meaningful
71
volition-for example, because of physical coercion or improper threat.
In modem times, the law of coercion is most commonly applied not in
situations in which one party is physically stronger than the other, but
instead in contexts in which one party enjoys a considerably more favorable
merits."). These reforms have increased discovery's prominence, and the opportunities for
its misuse. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND
DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 15 (1997) (finding that
discovery represented, on average, half of the total cost of litigation); William W.
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, andDiscovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L.
REv. 703, 703 (1989) ("Discovery, originally conceived as the servant of the litigants to
assist them in reaching a just outcome, now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict
disproportionate costs and burdens. Often it is conducted so aggressively and abusively that
it frustrates the objectives of the Federal Rules.").
68. The Supreme Court's Twombly decision, Bell Atil. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007), has resulted in a fair amount of confusion within lower courts and within the
academy. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("We
are not alone in finding the opinion confusing."); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-57 (2d
Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (noting uncertainty in interpretation because of
"conflicting signals"); Lee Goldman, Trouble for Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act:
Twombly, PleadingStandards, and the Oligopoly Problem, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1057, i058
("The Court's discussion of general pleading standards also generated great confusion.").
By all accounts, however, it made it easier for at least some defendants to prevail on 12(b)(6)
motions.
69. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion, " "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1016 (2003) ("Summary judgment ... has
moved to the center of the litigation stage as plaintiffs struggle to survive the motion in order
to reach trial as defendants increasingly invoke it in an attempt to prevent them from doing
so.").

70. Since 1980, federal funding for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) has varied.
Although LSC receives approximately the same number of actual dollars as it received in
1980, when inflation is factored in, its effective federal support is less than half of what it
was in 1980. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY,
SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL:

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE

UNITED STATES 38-39 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/
legal aid history_2007.pdf. Meanwhile, restrictions on its operations have proliferated. See
id. at 29-37.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 174-175 (1981).
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economic position. 72 The law of unconscionability invites courts to
examine not only the process by which an agreement was reached, but also
the substantive terms of that agreement. Disparities in bargaining power
are an explicit part of a court's unconscionability calculation. 73 Settlement,
in its perfect form, is the vehicle through which parties can arrive at
mutually preferred outcomes, regardless of their resources.
Settlement in practice, like litigation, too often also fails to protect
against the possibility that power imbalances will skew the result in ways
that deviate from settlement's underlying ideals. Poorer disputants often
have insufficient access to relevant information. 74 Poorer disputants
typically have a harder time understanding the implications of legally
complex settlement terms. 7 5 Those with fewer resources are susceptible to
being "outlasted" by a counterpart with a longer time horizon, a larger
bankroll, or fewer opportunity costs. Poorer disputants are probably also
more susceptible to agency costs in settlement, because they have less
information, fewer opportunities for effective monitoring, and less ability to
negotiate a more favorable retainer agreement than disputants who have
more resources. 76 In short, no reasonable observer would suggest that a
disputant's resources are irrelevant to the outcome that disputant can expect
to get through settlement.
Power imbalances create problems in the real world. The on-the-ground
practices of litigation and of settlement present pictures of sloppy, imperfect
efforts at overcoming the worst aspects of power imbalances. We might
reasonably compare the ideals of each process-ideals that largely assume
away the persistence of power imbalances. We might also compare the
sloppy reality of litigation with the sloppy reality of settlement.

72. Grace Giesel calls these contexts "the paradigm for almost every modem duress
claim." Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposalfor the ContractDuress Doctrine, 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 443, 445 (2005).
73. See Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[R]elative
bargaining power is an appropriate consideration in determining unconscionability ....");
Kinney v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The
oppression component [of unconscionability] arises from an inequality of bargaining power
of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the
part of the weaker party." (citations omitted)); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS 584 (4th ed. 2004).

74. Historically, the information asymmetries based on wealth were often profound, and
we continue to see these disparities today in many contexts. Insurers still know more than
their insured about trends, costs, and probabilities. Manufacturers still know more about
their products than consumers. And so on. I wonder, though, whether the Internet and the
ease with which information today flows will, at some point, dampen at least this aspect of
resources' skewing effects.
75. It is not clear that we cure this problem by assuming away the pro se problem.
Unless the market for attorneys' services is utterly dysfunctional, we probably should
assume that some counsel are more competent than others and that those with greater
resources have access to better representation.
76. For a helpful primer on the dynamics of agency in the context of settlement, see
Scott R. Peppet, Six Principlesfor Using NegotiatingAgents to Maximum Advantage, in THE
HANDBOOKOF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 189, 189-201.
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The one thing we cannot responsibly do is compare the idealized vision
of one practice against the sloppy reality of the other. Proponents of
litigation must not present the question as, "Which is better, (a) having a
judge protect the powerless litigant through the promotion ofpublic values
as articulatedby the law, or (b) sending that powerless litigant alone into
the hallway to compromise away her rights?"77 Proponents of settlement
must not present the question as, "Which is better, (a) employing fully
inclusive deliberative discourse to reach an elegant, fair, and creative
resolution, or (b) sending disputants into a formalistic process navigable
only by the rich?"78 The idealized visions of both processes are beautiful.
The practices of both processes are flawed. If power imbalances skew one
process, they skew the other, even if perhaps they do so in different ways.
B. Agency Costs
Anytime we hire anyone to do anything for us, there is at least a chance
of agency costs. Agents have different information. They have different
expertise or technical ability. Monitoring their behavior is difficult, costly,
or both. The financial and other incentives of principals and agents are
almost never perfectly aligned. And this is all true whether we are talking
about lawyers, landscapers, babysitters, or bureaucrats.
Owen Fiss articulates at least one piece of the broader concern about
agency costs when he warns about the possibility of an "absence of
authoritative consent" in settlements. 79 At its heart, Fiss's concern with
authoritative consent is the risk that a principal will, upon learning the terms
of settlement agreed to by an agent, say, "I didn't want to settle on those
terms !"
Agents sometimes negotiate settlements with which their clients are
disappointed. 80 In an ideal world, agents would understand and represent
fully their principals' views of the relevant interests, parameters, tradeoffs,
and opportunities. In practice, agents do not always understand their
clients' priorities and underlying interests. In practice, agents sometimes
have incentives at least partially at odds with some of their clients' interests.
And, as a practical matter, agents cannot always bring every decision back
to their clients for a new round of consultation. People do not merely hire
agents for the agents' skill sets. Sometimes, a client hires an agent because
the client does not have the bandwidth to do everything himself or herself.
77. I adopt Erica Fox's phrase "alone in the hallway" from her article by that title. Fox,
supranote 40, at 11.
78. Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974) (suggesting that the basic structure of

litigation is such that the "Haves" (wealthy, professional, repeat-players) will consistently
enjoy more favorable norms, rules, institutions, and outcomes).
79. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1078.
80. To be clear, I am not just talking about clients who are disappointed that
circumstances prevented their agents from achieving perfect outcomes. Instead, I am talking
about clients who are disappointed because their agents made agreements on their behalf,
when the client himself or herself, would not have agreed to such terms.
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With the delegation of a task to an agent comes the risk that the agent will
behave differently than the client would prefer.
When a dispute involves groups of people, agency risks are even more
pronounced for at least two reasons. The first reason is that scale makes it
even harder for an agent accurately to discern relevant interests. Even when
a group of people has some loose affiliation of conspicuous interests,
understanding their diverse perspectives becomes unmanageably difficult.
Fiss uses the example of people who bought Cuisinart food processors
during a particular decade, bound together as members of a single class
action. These members may share an interest in compensation, but an agent
representing them in settlement must know more than that in order to
represent them effectively. Do they need cash right away? Are they hoping
to make a public statement of some sort? Would they prefer a structured
settlement, with payment over time? Would they want the settlement to
include contingency arrangements? What kind of release? What, if any,
value would they place on a commitment by Cuisinart to change practices?
What are their privacy or confidentiality expectations? And so on. As
classes of plaintiffs rise into the hundreds of thousands, 81 we must
acknowledge that agents will have an increasingly hard time accurately
discerning a unified set of interests.
Second, even if an agent representing a group were confident that she or
he understood what each member of the group wanted, deciding what
actually to do often involves tradeoffs. An agent is left to weigh one set of
interests against other sets of interests. Should the union negotiators, who
represent a diverse workforce, push for better retirement benefits or more
paid holidays, a more comprehensive health plan or more salary? Should
the city attorney settle the claim in a way that allocates costs to the
maintenance department or to the police department? Should those who
represent people exposed to a potentially harmful chemical push for more
extensive monitoring or more compensation in the event an illness
develops, if there is a limited fund from which to draw the settlement?
In these ways, agency makes settlement potentially problematic in
practice. And no mechanism can fully "resolve" the prospect of these
agency complications. Lawyers' codes of ethics can insist that attorneys
defer to their clients' interests, adhere to their clients' interests regarding the
scope of settlement authority, and communicate settlement decisions to
their clients. 82 Courts can review prospective class representatives and

81. One ongoing gender discrimination class action involves even more parties than that.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 144 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("[B]oth parties

estimate that the proposed class numbers over one million women."). The certification in
this case is under en banc review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See
Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of
Monolithic ClassActions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 71, 72 (2006).

82. Legal ethics standards require attorneys to "abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation," to "consult with the client as to the means by which they
are to be pursued," and to "abide by a client's decision whether to settle [the] matter."
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weigh their fitness to represent the class effectively. 83 Courts can review
the substance of proposed settlements in class actions, and can look
carefully for evidence that class representatives have not advanced their
own interests at the expense of those of class members. 84 At most, even
this combination of measures guards against only some of the agency costs
that arise in the context of settlement.
Unfortunately, agency costs are unavoidable in litigation as well. For
example, every structure for attorneys' fees is fraught with the prospect of
mismatching incentives. 85 Few clients have the capacity to monitor
attorneys' behavior in any meaningful way, both because of the cost
associated with such monitoring and because of asymmetries in information
and expertise. Even if a client were to monitor an attorney's actions, and
even if a client were to detect behavior of which the client disapproves, the
client's options are limited and unattractive.
Firing an attorney is
enormously costly, because the client would then need to pay another
attorney to get up to speed. 86 Filing a malpractice action against an
attorney is possible, but malpractice actions are successful only in the most
egregious cases. Courts are hesitant to second-guess an attorney's strategic
decisions about how to craft the complaint, how to navigate joinder,
whether and how to file a dispositive motion, how to navigate various trial
decisions, or whether to file a particular sort of appeal. 87 Furthermore,
because so much of litigation behavior now takes place in discovery,
outside of the immediate view of the courts, few formal constraints on

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(a) (1999); see also In re Brown, 453 P.2d 958 (Ariz.
1969) (en banc); In re Ragland, 697 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1998) (per curiam).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1797.1 (3d ed. 1998) ("The main

judicial concern [of FRCP 23(e)] is that the rights of the passive class members not be
jeopardized by the proposed settlement. The court also must be sensitive to the possibility of
collusion between the parties actively participating in the action.").
85. An attorney operating on a contingency basis often has a stronger incentive to settle
more quickly, even if it is for less, than clients. An attorney operating on an hourly basis
often has an incentive to overinvest hours in the representation, billing more hours than the
expected return on those marginal hours of work might be justified in the client's view. An
attorney operating on a flat-fee basis often has an incentive to underinvest hours in the
representation, because he or she receives no additional compensation for marginal hours
spent on the case. Fee arrangements skew settlement behaviors of both attorneys and their
clients. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
341 (1987).
86. This is one of the principal criticisms of the Collaborative Law movement, because
its disqualification agreements put parties in the position of having to replace existing
attorneys with new attorneys-all of whom have to be educated about the nature of the
lawsuit. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Koford, Conflicted Collaborating: The Ethics of Limited
Representation in CollaborativeLaw, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827, 838-40 (2008); John
Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute
Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 81, 117-21 (2008).
87. See, e.g., J. Mark Cooney, Benching the Monday-Morning Quarterback: The
"Attorney Judgment" Defense to Legal-Malpractice Claims, 52 WAYNE L. REv. 1051
(2006).
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attorneys' discretion exist. 88 As a result, few formal mechanisms dampen
the possibility that attorneys will engage in behavior at odds with the
interests of her or his client.
Furthermore, litigation involves tradeoffs in much the same way as
settlement. Although one simplistic picture of litigation is one in which
each adversary advances his or her position in absolute terms, the reality of
modem litigation is that parties must often navigate complicated decisions
about how to conduct the litigation. Some of the decisions are strategic.
Should we do additional discovery at this point? Should we file this
motion? Should we join this party? These decisions call for tradeoffs
based on the expected costs and benefits of each approach.
Some litigators' decisions, however, call for tradeoffs involving interests
or principles. "[I]nterest groups that supposedly are represented through the
parties to litigation-whether African-Americans, abortion opponents,
evangelical Christians, or Libertarians-are seldom monolithic in their
views. Litigants often purport to express the unified perspective of groups
that, in fact, are often internally heterogeneous." 89 Furthermore, the
complex realities of real-world litigation sometimes demand that groups
struggle with tradeoffs they would prefer, in theory, not to have to make.
As a board member of the ACLU once remarked in the context of litigation
that surfaced internal divisions within the organization, "[flor a civil
libertarian, choosing between constitutional guarantees is 'Sophie's
Choice. "90

We see examples of this even within the federal government. The U.S.
Department of Justice is the representative of the United States in litigation,
and it presents the position of the United States in that capacity. 9 1 But of
course, in any complex piece of litigation, different branches of the
government, and even different agencies within the same Executive, will
have differing and sometimes opposing interests about whether and how a
particular action is litigated. The decision to litigate does not cause these
differences to disappear. Instead, it merely requires that they be resolved
internally, in advance of the litigation. 92 Even if its conduct of the actual
88. For a thoughtful and creative proposal regarding an approach to curbing abuses of
the discovery process, see Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery
Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1620 (1996) ("One problem with current law is that many
judges are reluctant to pull out the big strap of discovery sanctions except when convinced
that the lawyers involved are so utterly recalcitrant that they deserve a serious whupping....
[A] major improvement in the moral education of litigators would be effected by increased
sanctioning of smaller, more annoying discovery abuses with smaller, more annoying
punishments.").
89. Seul, supra note 8, at 940.
90. Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney

King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 611 (1994) (describing the ACLU's internal
debates about the stance it would take on double jeopardy questions in the Rodney King
police officer cases).
91. See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2006).
92. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation
on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1345, 1359-71 (2000) (surveying some of the
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litigation did not involve compromises, the Department of Justice's
fundamental position will be viewed with disappointment by at least some
of the people it represents.
Even if we focus only on the question of "authoritative consent" Fiss
raises about the role of agents, litigation does little to cure the problem.
Modem malpractice standards and ethical standards almost uniformly
assume that a client wants to abdicate any and all decisions about litigation
conduct to her or his attorney. The rules do not require an attorney to defer
to a client on how to prosecute or defend a case. Instead, they treat the
decision to litigate as though it were a binary decision, after which the
client has no substantial interests 93 There may be good reason for this
deference to attorneys' decisions. My point is not that we should--or even
could-demand that an attorney consult with her or his client before asking
a question on cross-examination, before responding to a motion, or before
making a particular discovery demand. Instead, my point is that each of
those decisions is one about which a client may have particular interestsinterests that will not necessarily be addressed by the attorney's decisions.
Just as attorneys risk settling in ways that clients subsequently dislike,
attorneys risk litigating in ways that clients subsequently dislike. In the
most egregious cases of each, the attorney's behavior may be the product of
malpractice. An attorney may exceed the boundaries of the settlement
authority a client has given, or an attorney may make litigation decisions so
at odds with industry standards that the attorney risks professional sanction.
Most of the time, however, an attorney's behavior-even behavior that may
be self-interested-is de facto shielded from review or sanction. In short,
the risk of agency problems plague both settlement and litigation.
C. Barriersto Court Access
Because courts are purely reactive, they function properly only if
disputants have access to the courthouse. In an idealized vision of
litigation, any aggrieved person would not only know his or her rights, but
also would understand and have access to the state machinery designed to
give effect to those rights. In practice, modem disputants encounter a
number of different barriers to court access. The most conspicuous reason
disputants might not perceive themselves to have access to the courthouse
stems from financial concerns. In short, litigation is expensive, and
many-accurately---perceive litigation's justice as beyond their price range.
96
Litigation can also be costly in terms of time,94 reputation, 9 5 and emotion.

complications of the U.S. Department of Justice's role as singular representative of multiple
agencies).
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. 1 (1999).
94. 1 have a former student who spent considerable time studying and working with
nursing homes and other care facilities on disputes involving patients nearing the ends of
their lives. I find it difficult to read court systems' typical time-to-disposition statistics with
her clients in mind.
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Even those who can afford its financial costs may perceive other litigation
costs to be prohibitively high. In short, litigation's ideal assumes that
disputants have unfettered and costless access to the courts-a level of
access no disputants currently enjoy in practice.
One piece of Fiss's opposition to settlement might be understood as
stemming from his concern over ADR's effects on court access. What if
settlement-promotion efforts created barriers, hurdles, and pressures that
prevent disputants from accessing courts?
At the time of Against Settlement, some of the settlement-promoting
measures under consideration might have provided a basis for such a fear.
Frank E. A. Sander famously described a possible restructuring of the
modem courthouse as a forum in which disputants would be faced with an
array of different dispute resolution mechanisms. 97 Dubbed "the multi-door
courthouse," 98 one model of this vision would have the decision of process
allocated to a government official, rather than remaining the disputants'
choice. In that sense, the multi-door courthouse might reasonably be
understood as a barrier to court access. One might similarly read the
transition to a stance for managerial judges as one that would threaten
parties' access to the courtroom.
As an empirical matter, Fiss's concern about these aspects of settlement's
potential to prevent disputants from litigating was, at a minimum,
overstated. The number of jury trials has remained relatively constant over
the past twenty-five years, although the rate of jury trials has decreased.
Settlement's role in the disposition of cases is difficult to track, although
most observers see a greater effect stemming from changes in courts'
treatment of dispositive motions, for example. We have seen the
institutionalization of many forms of ADR in many places and, along with
it, an increasing concern about the mechanisms by which court systems are

95. We might intuitively understand the reputational concerns of a small-town doctor
accused of malpractice. The reputational costs of litigation apply in larger contexts as well.
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. BRADFORD, DISCRIMINATION, LEGAL COSTS AND REPUTATIONAL COSTS

25-27 (2005) (estimating that the reputational costs to publicly traded firms accused of
gender or race discrimination by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or in
other high-profile cases is more than forty times the estimated legal damages claimed in the
litigation).
96. Being part of litigation is emotionally costly, as anyone who has spent sleepless
nights with a litigation party--or even a litigation witness-will attest. In some
circumstances, those emotional costs are necessary, and the litigation represents the prospect
of the end of the emotional tolls associated with the underlying dispute. For others,
however, it is easy to understand why they might judge the emotional costs of litigating too
high, and therefore forego the litigation alternative.
97. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,77 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
98. Although virtually universally attributed to him, Frank Sander did not coin this
phrase during his presentation at the Pound Conference, nor does it appear in the text of the
proceedings reprinted in the Federal Rules Decisions. Instead, the phrase appeared as a
companion to a graphic on the cover of a magazine reporting on the Pound Conference. See
Michael L. Moffitt, Before the Big Bang: The Making of an ADR Pioneer,22 NEGOTIATION
J. 437, 437-38 (2006).
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"encouraging" settlement. But as a numerical matter, settlements have not
displaced litigation in the way Fiss feared.
The real risk to court access over the past twenty-five years does not
appear in Against Settlement.99 The real risk to court access in recent years
has been arbitration.
Arbitration has gained a prominence in modem dispute resolution that
was almost unimaginable at the time Against Settlement was written. At the
time Fiss wrote his article, arbitration was the mechanism of choice for
100
many labor disputes and for certain commercial or maritime disputes.
By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court, at the time, expressly excluded from
arbitration entire categories of disputes that are routinely submitted to
arbitration today. 1 1 Today, arbitration agreements are enforced in a
staggering array of contexts. In employment agreements, in health care
agreements, in consumer purchases, even in contexts in which statutory
rights protect against various forms of discrimination, arbitration clauses
99. Owen Fiss considered the role of arbitration in at least one of his earlier works.
Readers of Against Settlement would not be surprised to find that he categorized arbitration
as private, and therefore, in his view, incapable of articulating or enforcing public norms.
Such readers might be surprised, however, to read of Fiss's apparent embrace of arbitration
for certain private disputes-an embrace that finds no articulation in Against Settlement,
even though it was written only a few years after Fiss's foreword regarding The Forms of
Justice. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 30 (1979)
("Of course, some disputes may not threaten or otherwise implicate a public value. All the
disputants may, for example, acknowledge the norms and confine their dispute to the
interpretation of the words of the contract or the price of a bumper. Such disputes may wind
their way into court, and judges may spend time on these purely private disputes-private
because only the interests and behavior of the immediate parties to the dispute are at issue.
That seems, however, an extravagant use of public resources, and thus it seems quite
appropriate for those disputes to be handled not by courts, but by arbitrators (though courts
may have to act as background institutions enforcing or maybe even creating obligations to
arbitrate). Arbitration is like adjudication in that it too seeks the right, the just, the true
judgment. There is, however, an important difference in the two processes arising from the
nature of the decisional agency-one private, the other public." (citing MARTIN P. GOLDING,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 106-25 (1975); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1976); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979))).
100. Arbitration has a long history of application in commercial contexts, particularly
those with international components. See, e.g., William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of
Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193; Soia
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961). Labor arbitration,
with its strong foundation in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, has enjoyed
consistent support from the Supreme Court since at least the 1950s. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of
Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
101. For example, securities disputes under the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)), or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006)), were
deemed inarbitrable until 1989. Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is inapplicable to securities claims), with Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overturning Wilko v. Swan).
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are routinely enforced. 10 2 Regardless of the scale of the dispute, courts
today consistently stay litigation in favor of arbitration when an arbitration
10 3
agreement even arguably encompasses the dispute.
Some states have perceived this policy "favoring arbitration" as having
gone too far. Perhaps they have done so for Fissian reasons, or perhaps
they perceive other undesirable effects of the proliferation of arbitration
agreements. In most cases, however, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) 104 preemptive scope has blocked these
state efforts at curtailing arbitration's reach. 0 5 Despite the language of the
FAA, 106 the federal policy "favoring" arbitration reaches down even into
state courts and demands that arbitration clauses be given effect. As a
result, arbitration displaces litigation.
Unlike settlement, which I argue above has become inextricably
intertwined with the cadence of modem litigation, arbitration is a true
barrier to the courthouse. Arbitration is an alternative path, and once
disputants head down that path, they are quite unlikely to return to
litigation. If an arbitration clause even arguably covers the dispute in
question, courts force parties to arbitrate.' 0 7 If an arbitration clause covers
some, but not all of the relevant issues, courts force the case to arbitration
first. 10 8

If a party challenges the enforceability of a contract, which

happens to contain an arbitration clause, an arbitrator decides the
enforceability question. 10 9 If a party is unhappy with an arbitrator's
102. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (upholding
arbitration clauses even in cases alleging unlawful employment discrimination under federal
statutes); Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 318, 321; Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right To
Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003, at Dl (suggesting that consumers must often "forget about
joining a gym, getting a cellphone or even seeing [their] doctor" unless they agree to
arbitrate).
103. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (extending "generous[] constru[al] as to issues of arbitrability" beyond labormanagement agreements); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 583 (stating that
"[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of [arbitral] coverage" in the context of labor
agreements).
104. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
105. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that the
FAA preempts Montana state law requiring arbitration clauses to appear in a particular
format); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts a
California statute disallowing arbitration in franchise agreements).
106. For an articulation of the view that the FAA should not be given effect in state court,
see Justice Thomas's dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) ("The [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration .. "); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
108. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp., 460 U.S. 1.
109. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967)
(declaring arbitration clauses "separable" such that an arbitrator decides enforceability
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decision, there are virtually no meaningful opportunities to appeal the
decision to a court, even if the parties mutually would prefer to have the
courts review the decision."10 In short, arbitration creates a far greater
threat to litigation than anything settlement has been able to muster.
III. QUESTIONS To KEEP ASKING
The most provocative, interesting pieces of scholarship are not those with
all of the answers. The best examples of legal scholarship are the ones that
ask good questions. Owen Fiss's Against Settlement continues to be
required reading in law school courses across the country not because it
presents the final word on whether we ought to celebrate settlement.
Indeed, many who read the article disagree fundamentally with the
conclusion Fiss urges. Instead, Against Settlement has an enduring quality
because it demands that we wrestle with important questions.
In this final Part, I suggest that Fiss presented readers with at least three
separate categories of questions: about the practice of settlement, about the
ideals of settlement, and about the implications of all of this on legal
education. I applaud all three of these questions. Each is certainly good
enough that no answer could claim to be definitive.
My suggestion is that, while we are exploring these aspects of settlement,
we also ask the same questions of litigation. Litigation and settlement are
linked in practice. The values they seek to promote are often linked. And
they are linked, at least in part, in the challenges they present. Our
understanding of each will be richer for understanding the other, and these
three lenses provide useful perspectives on each.
A. In What Ways Are Litigation and/orSettlement FailingTo Live up to
Their Ideals?
The practice of settlement often fails to live up to settlement's ideals. In
this regard, settlement is not different than most human endeavors. We
aspire to certain moral ideals, and we fall short."Il Most of us talk a good
game about physical fitness, about patience with our children and
colleagues, and about dental hygiene. And most of us fall short on those
endeavors, too. It is not surprising, therefore, that as we go about settling
cases, our actions do not always fulfill settlement's highest ideals.
Settlements can be autonomy-enhancing. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow
explains,

questions, unless the challenge is specifically directed only at the enforceability of the
arbitration clause itself).
110. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
111. Dominican Priest Father Dominic Holtz has said, of humans, "We are 1000 watt
lamps, with 40 watt bulbs." Letter from Sheila Heen to author (May 20, 2009) (quoting
Father Holtz, Seminar: Dialogue on Truth, Aquinas Institute, St. Louis, Missouri (Feb. 27,

2009)) (on file with author).
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To the extent that certain kinds of settlement processes include more
participation by the parties, they may also facilitate greater democratic
participation in the legal system than the stylized ritual dominated by
lawyers that is the formal adjudication system. To the extent that at least
some forms of facilitated settlement, including mediation, minitrials, and
some settlement conferences, involve greater, rather than lesser,
participation from the actual disputants, "control" of the dispute by the
parties involved may make some forms of dispute resolution
more
1
responsive to parties', rather than professionals', interests. 12

In practice, we have indications that at least some settlements come about
in ways that reflect poorly on the value of party autonomy. We hear stories
of judges or mediators strong-arming parties in ways that remove, rather
than add, choices. 1 13 Jackie Nolan-Haley explains that, on the ground,
"[r]eports of duress and coercion . . . bring a dose of reality to the

romanticized version of the mediation story."' 114 Nancy Welsh argues that
"the originally dominant vision of self-determination [in mediation], which
borrowed heavily from concepts of party empowerment, is yielding to a
different vision in the court-connected context." 115 As far back as 1991,
some within the ADR community have been sounding warnings about the
end of "good mediation," and in large measure, what they were talking
about was the loss of settlements in which party autonomy was a primary
driver.1 16 Those who promote settlement's potential should be worried if,
in practice, settlement does not fulfill its promise of enhancing disputants'

autonomy.
Settlements can also be value-creating. The idea of efficient trades,
based on individualized preferences and available information, is not the
only thing that motivates people to settle. Nor is it the only good thing

about settlement, but it is certainly one of settlement's promises. If, in
practice, settlements are not, in fact, value-creating, then we have reason to

112. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4, at 2689.
113. See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a Clearer
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 45 (1994); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement, supra note 4, at 509-11; Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995);
Lawrence F. Schiller & James A. Wall, Jr., JudicialSettlement Techniques, 5 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 39, 43 (1981) ("It should also be borne in mind that forced or coerced settlements,
imparted by the judge, are encountered occasionally."); John C. Cratsley, JudicialEthics and
Judicial Settlement Practices, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2006, at 16, 17 (reporting
"complaints of judicial coercion and intimidation in settlement conferences").
114. Nolan-Haley, supra note 40; see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent
in Mediation: A GuidingPrinciplefor Truly Educated Decisionmaking,74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 775 (1999); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Consent in Mediation, Disp'. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2008, at 4, 4-5.
115. Welsh, supra note 40, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Making
Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got To Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
787 (2001).
116. James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and HashingIt Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (1991) (quoting Albie Davis from a 1988 ADR
workshop in Tallahassee, Florida).
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be concerned about settlement. And candid observations suggest at least
some reason for concern.
Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, for
117
example, in their famous study entitled Lawyers as Agents of the Devil,
examined a series of disputes in which some pairs were represented by
lawyers on both sides, some pairs were pro se on both sides, and some pairs
included an attorney on one side but not the other. The legal community
received one piece of the Ashenfelter and Bloom study as good news: in
those pairs in which only one side was represented, the side with the
attorney did comparatively better. The potentially embarrassing news came
with the finding that the outcomes for those with lawyers involved on both
sides were indistinguishable from the outcomes for those with no lawyers
involved at all-except that those who had lawyers were worse off because
they had to pay lawyers' fees. In short, the lawyers did nothing to help their
clients find value-creating options, and instead acted as mere transaction
costs. If attorneys involved in disputes are unable to find value-creating,
non-zero-sum options, then an important piece of the justification for
settlement is missing.
Settlements can be values-promoting, can be community-enhancing, and
can be community-enabling.
Why have disputants been voluntarily
bringing disagreements to their religious or spiritual leaders for millennia?
Why do some members of tribal or other close-knit communities often raise
disputes before elders, or people serving the functional equivalent of elders?
Why do gay and lesbian couples often bring disputes to mediators from
their own communities? These third parties have no enforcement authority
or claim to a uniquely accurate understanding of each party's formal legal
entitlements. 118 Instead, they bring a perspective on their communities'
fundamental values, experiences, and practices that can strengthen both the
disputants and the relevant communities. Settlement through such means
11 9
can enhance, rather than threaten, the perpetuation of these values.
117. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's
Dilemma Game 21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4447, 1993)
(concluding, after studying employment and family claims that "the data all imply that it is
individually rational for the parties to retain costly agents so as to increase the likelihood that
they will prevail, even though there is little evidence that the result will be any different from
what would occur if both parties did not retain agents").
118. For a thoughtful treatment of these community-enabling aspects of settlement, see
Clark Freshman, PrivatizingSame-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687,

1762 (1997) ("A community-enabling mediation would encourage parties to consider the
range of possible values and practices that could affect how they resolve a dispute or
structure an agreement. This would include active consideration of the ways that others,
including communities that the parties find valuable, have resolved similar disputes or
reached similar agreements." (footnotes omitted)).
119. McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 8, at 1664 ("The soundest and deepest part of the
ADR movement ...rests on values--of religion, community, and work place-that are
more vigorous than Fiss thinks."); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and
Systemic Change, 2007 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 52 (arguing that public values are routinely
"developed outside the formal organs of the state" and that settlement can "institutionalize a
mechanism for this kind of normative development").
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Settlement can even enhance our capacity to engage in an active democratic
society. 120 If in practice, however, settlements represent nothing more than
valueless, standard-free private ordering in which disputants externalize
costs on nonparticipants, then the justification for settlement is weak.
Settlement is an eclectic practice, with perhaps almost as many forms as
there are disputants. No simple characterization would accurately capture
the full range of things going on today under the umbrella of "settlement."
And yet, a careful and honest observer would note that at least some of the
time, settlement in practice fails to achieve its ideals. Some percentage of
settlements are crude in their creation, inelegant in their structure, and
shoddy in their implementation. We must not give settlement a "pass"
solely on the basis of its lofty ideals, if those ideals are not reliably borne
out in practice.
As with settlement, the practice of litigation presents a mixed picture,
particularly when litigation is compared with its lofty ideals. And as with
settlement, litigation's implementation shortcomings should be seen as an
understandable product of the human actors who form the core of the
activity. Litigants have partial, and sometimes flawed, information.
Litigants and their lawyers operate under a complex set of incentives, not
all of which support the public values to which Fiss would have us pay
attention. 12 1 And because people are people, litigation does not always
unfold exactly by design.
Litigation can be navigable and comprehensible to the average citizen.
In many jurisdictions, for example, small claims court proceedings often
resemble the impromptu verbal free-for-alls that appear on popular daytime
television. 122 Litigants in these proceedings need no sophisticated

120. See Seul, supra note 8, at 942 ("When we litigate conflicts, we undertake our most
difficult conversations in a way that is overly mediated-mediated, that is, through the
impersonal strictures of the judicial process, where our primary conversation partner is the
Court-rather than having these conversations directly with other affected parties . . .
through a facilitated, non-binding negotiation process. As a result, we practice a weaker
form of democracy than we otherwise could.").
121. Many suits are brought by plaintiffs who were genuinely injured and who seek only
appropriate compensation from those they believe to be responsible for their injuries. Some
plaintiffs bring strike suits, nuisance suits, and others merely because they perceive a tactical
advantage or opportunity to extract settlement value from scared defendants. Compare Kozel
& Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 1850 n.1 ("The problem of litigation aimed at obtaining a
nuisance-value settlement has long concerned legal policy makers and analysts, though
seemingly never more so than in recent years."), with Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance
Settlement "Problem": The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 221, 279 (2008) ("Nuisance litigation is frequently complained about, yet seldom
proved. The perception of a crisis outpaces any documented reality."). Many litigants
engage in discovery exactly as it is intended-a self-regulated exchange of relevant
information, with no need for judicial involvement. Some litigants engage in discovery
abuse, demanding information for the sole purpose of harassing or driving up litigation costs
for the other side. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: FurtherAnalysis of
the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 682 (1998).
122. One of the court mediation programs I used to supervise in the 1990s was a source of
cases and disputants for television's Judge Judy. As anyone who has spent years mediating
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understanding of the law, and few of them even need lawyers. The picture
is quite different today in courts without jurisdictional caps on the amount
in controversy. Despite Charles Clark's vision of a set of civil procedure
rules that would prioritize resolving cases on their merits, rather than on the
basis of formalistic filters, modem litigation is navigable only by those who
are highly trained. Pro se litigants stand virtually no chance, as a practical
matter. 123 And in many kinds of cases, one needs not just an attorney, but
an attorney who is specialized in that particular area of the law. 124 Many of
the developments that have created such a complicated system have been
justified as necessary to protect litigants' rights or to enhance courts'
efficiency. I do not suggest that these reforms have been unjustified. But
an honest assessment of modem litigation demands the recognition that the
process has become more Byzantine and more removed from the
comprehension of the typical participant. How obvious will the courthouse
be as an option for those seeking justice if they perceive the courthouse as a
125
black box?
Litigation can be conducted by advocates of the highest caliber. From
Daniel Webster to Atticus Finch, the image of the highly ethical, devoted,
and talented attorney is a persistent one. Many modem-day litigators
deserve much the same acclaim. In practice, of course, not all attorneys are
as competent or as ethical as those of storybook tales. The discovery of
attorneys near the heart of the Enron debacle and other scandals from earlier
in this decade resulted in changes to certain parts of attorneys' formal
ethical obligations. Without question, the single most heartbreaking
moment of the time when I served as a judicial clerk was watching a group
of injured plaintiffs lose their claims because of what I perceived to be the
incompetence of their attorneys. State bar efforts to screen, to educate, to
rehabilitate, to punish, and to exclude attorneys who fail to live up to the
standards of the profession will always be necessary. We must never
imagine that the presence of a licensed lawyer is a sufficient guarantor of
the kind of professionalism upon which our system's functioning depends.
Litigation functions properly only if everyone has highly competent
counsel.
small claims cases will attest, courtroom television producers are unlikely to run out of
material any time soon.
123. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the
Link Between Damage Caps andAccess to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 635,
646 (2006) (reporting on a study finding that in medical malpractice claims, pro se plaintiffs
succeeded in less than two percent of cases, while plaintiffs represented by counsel
succeeded in more than one third of the cases).
124. See Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter, Note, Supply, Demand, and the Changing
Economics of Large Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REv. 2087, 2110 (2008) ("[S]ome types of
technical legal work may require such intense specialization that only a handful of lawyers in
a particular practice area or geographical region can provide adequate services.").
125. 1 can easily imagine why people might opt for the mysterious or even mystical in
many realms of their lives. But I thought that the abolition of trials by ordeal signaled a
rejection of the idea that one ought to trust the fates, the Divine, or other unknowns to
dispense justice in the kinds of disputes likely to appear in court.
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Litigation can be a process in which a professional judge of the highest
caliber oversees a clash of ideas, aimed at uncovering the truth and applying
the law impartially. In litigation's idealized form, the judge has experience,
ethics, and judgment that are beyond reproach. The ideal judge weighs the
relevant evidence, arguments, and law, and, when necessary, decides on the
basis of those considerations and not on any self-interest. Many judges live
up to even these high standards. 126 And yet, judges are human and present
human failings with regularity.
Some judicial transgressions are
egregious-the kinds of things that can be at least partially remedied by
formal ethical mechanisms. 127 Recusal standards and procedures exist to
address the context in which a judge holds an improper interest in a case. 128
Appellate bodies exist to correct conspicuous errors of law, when judges
fail, in the opinion of the reviewing court, to have applied the law correctly
to a particular set of facts. These sorts of intralitigation protections are
probably the best we can do to assure judges' impartiality and accuracy.
What about considerations that would never appear in a courtroom
transcript or in a published opinion? For those judgeships that are filled by
popular election, what might the impacts be of recent increases in the costs
of financing a judicial election? 129 For judges with indefinite appointments,
130
what might the impacts be of their comparatively tiny judicial salaries?
What might be the impact of the increasingly common practice of sitting
judges "retiring" to take on highly compensated positions as private
126. The judge for whom I had the privilege of clerking is a woman I hold in the highest
possible professional and personal regard. My anecdotal conversations with other former
judicial clerks have confirmed my assumption that my experience was not anomalous. I am
not surprised that judicial clerks-those who spend perhaps the most direct time with judges,
observing their decision making in practice--often wind up saying the same of the judges for
whom they worked.
127. See, e.g., Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme To Jail
Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22 (reporting on two state court judges
who recently pled guilty to taking millions of dollars in kickbacks to send teenagers to
privately run detention centers).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). Judges can also be required to step down from a case
for extrajudicial behavior that casts doubt on judicial impartiality. See, e.g., United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (removing the district court judge
presiding over the Microsoft antitrust litigation, in part for having compared Bill Gates with
Napoleon during interviews with a journalist while the case was still pending).
129. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly FinancedJudicialElections: An Overview, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1468-71 (2001); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections
Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003).
130. See, e.g., DENISE A. CARDMAN, ABA, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NEED FOR
FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY REFORM 1 (2007); JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2007) (discussing only the issue ofjudicial pay and concluding that
"[t]he dramatic erosion of judicial compensation will inevitably result in a decline in the
quality of persons willing to accept a lifetime appointment as a federal judge"); Letter from
Robert D. Evans, ABA Governmental Affairs Dir., to every member of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/judiciary/
2006decO8_colahjrl02h l.pdf ("Judicial salaries already are so inadequate that they threaten
the vitality of the judiciary ...."). This phenomenon and these concerns are not limited to
the federal bench. See, e.g., OR. JUDICIAL DEP'T, THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2008 REPORT ON
JUDICIAL COMPENSATION (2008).
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arbitrators immediately after stepping down from the bench? 13 1 Even if we
assume away these extraneous considerations, an increasing body of
scholarship has helped us to understand that the intellectual mechanisms,
the cognitive heuristics through which judges make decisions, are routinely
32
flawed in predictable-but largely unreviewable-ways. 1
The point of all of this is not to suggest that litigation is so flawed that it
should be jettisoned. The practice of litigation sometimes fails to live up to
the highest ideals of litigation. It shares this imperfection with the practice
of settlement. What matters is that we continue to observe and report
honestly on the gaps between both processes' ideals and their
implementation. The more honest and accurate a picture we have of the
shortcomings of each, the better positioned we will be to craft changes
aimed at bringing each process closer to its ideals.
B. In What Ways Are Litigation and/orSettlement Overselling Their
Legitimate Potential?
Owen Fiss may have been a useful buzz-kill in 1984. The landscape
appeared exuberant for alternative dispute resolution at the time he wrote
Against Settlement.
The 1976 Pound Conference on the Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, widely hailed as the "big
bang" moment in the development of ADR in the United States, was a
recent memory. 133 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was issuing
134
calls for systematic reforms, largely along the lines of increased ADR.
Mediation centers, once concentrated in a few cities, began to proliferate
across the country. 135 It is quite likely that, at the time Fiss authored
Against Settlement, ADR was being oversold. Mediation was advertised as
a way to discover quicker resolutions, greater customization, and better
understanding. Mediation would bring justice, peace, and harmony not
13 1. Justice Alito, for example, raised concerns about the practice of judges retiring to
join private arbitration firms, "where they have the potential to earn the equivalent of the
district judge salary in a matter of months." Oversight Hearing on "Federal Judicial
Compensation" Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet and IntellectualProperty of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) (testimony of Samuel Alito,
Associate J., Supreme Court of the United States).
132. The best and most extensive literature on this topic of which I am aware comes from
Chris Guthrie. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008); Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistkch, Heuristics and Biases in
Bankruptcy Judges, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 167 (2007); Andrew J.
Wistkch, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
133. The ADR movement was not, of course, "born" during the Pound Conference. For
more on the antecedents of the figure most prominently associated with ADR's "birth," see
Moffitt, supra note 98, at 437.
134. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
135. In 1976 the number of community mediation centers was estimated at ten. By 1986,
that number had risen to approximately one hundred. Ten years later, the number was
approximately 550. Larry Ray, Community Mediation Centers: Delivering First-Class
Services to Low-Income Peoplefor the Past Twenty Years, 15 MEDIATION Q. 71, 73 (1997).
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only to individual disputants, but also to the communities in which they
lived. 136 Furthermore, mediation participants could137expect to find inner
harmony, reduced cholesterol, and more lustrous hair.
Against this backdrop, some of Fiss's cautionary notes were almost
certainly helpful. Some of the specific proposals he described came to pass.
For example, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended8
to make settlement an explicit part of the managerial functions of judges.13
As a result, we have been wrestling with the implications of having a judge
who is presiding over litigation entangled in the exploration for its possible
settlement ever since. 139 Some of the proposals Fiss feared at the time of
Against Settlement were only partially adopted. For example, although
many court systems have ADR offerings of one sort or another, none has
fully adopted Frank E. A. Sander's vision of a multi-door courthouse. And
some of the settlement-expansion proposals Fiss feared were never adopted.
For example, Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was never
amended to require unsuccessful plaintiffs to compensate defendants for
attorney fees incurred after offers of judgment, although it is understandable
why the proposal gave Fiss concern. 140 Whether Fiss deserves credit--or
blame-for putting the brakes on ADR's expansion, I do not know. But in
at least some of the cases listed above, his concern that ADR might be
overstating the possible extent of its positive contributions appears to have
been well founded.

136. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, "Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In." A Trial
Lawyer's Searchfor Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 653, 658 (describing
the migration of the ADR movement from nonlawyers to lawyers "seeking kinder processes,
empowerment of disputants, and better, longer-lasting relationships between disputants");
Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice System Stifled by Its Costs and Its Complexity, Experts Warn, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1983, at Al (quoting Chief Justice Warren E. Burger as contrasting ADR
with the "almost irrational focus-virtually a mania--on litigation as a way to solve all
problems").
137. I confess that I cannot find support for the last of these assertions, but I stand by its
basic sentiment.
138. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983).
139. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
140. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1074. Scholars disagree about the ongoing effects of Rule
68 in its current form. Most agree that it is virtually never employed, but it still may have
effects on cases in which the plaintiff may be statutorily entitled to attorney fees. See, e.g.,
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, Rule 68
Offers of Judgment: The Practices and Opinions of Experienced Civil Rights and
Employment DiscriminationAttorneys, 241 F.R.D. 332 (2007); Cynthia L. Street, Rule 68:
Erie Go Again-Costs, Attorneys' Fees, and Plaintiffs' Offers-Substance or Procedure?,20
Miss. C. L. REV. 341, 345 (2000); Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and
Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59
VAND. L. REV. 155 (2006). For the interesting suggestion that Rule 68 was never intended to
encourage settlement, see Robert G. Bone, "To EncourageSettlement": Rule 68, Offers of
Judgment, and the History of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1561, 1562 (2008) (suggesting instead that Rule 68 was "designed to prevent plaintiffs from
imposing costs unfairly when the defendant offered what the plaintiff was entitled to receive
from trial, and to enable defendants to avoid paying those costs when the plaintiff persisted
with the suit").
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We should remain vigilant today about the distinction between what
settlement can offer and what it cannot. In Part I of this essay, I list out a
number of things settlement might or even can produce. Settlement can
produce lighter dockets.
Settlement can produce outcomes that are
efficient, value-maximizing, customized, and more far-reaching than
litigation. The process of exploring settlement can enhance parties'
autonomy, can improve relationships, and can encourage moral deliberation
and growth. 14 1 If ever these sentences are reworded to suggest that
settlement does produce these benefits, warning alarms should be sounded.
Settlement's ideals include these possibilities. Its practice on the ground, at
best, sometimes produces these results.
Furthermore, settlement's potential must not be oversold. For all of the
benefits settlement provides, and I believe there are many, there are some
things it cannot provide in the same way as other processes. For example,
Settlements rarely bind
settlements produce fewer precedents.
nonparticipants. Settlements do not explicitly protect the interests of those
who are absent from settlement discussions. It is no indictment of
settlement as a practice to acknowledge the limits of its contributions.
of settlement's
Indeed, I think those who are clearest about the boundaries
142
capacities are among its most successful advocates.
Similarly, we should remain vigilant about the distinction between
litigation's promise and what it can legitimately be expected to deliver.
Litigation's promise includes the rule of law, equal treatment under the law,
dispassionate assessment of the evidence, and so on. Litigation can provide
such a process, sometimes. We have appellate courts precisely because we
have come to accept that errors will occur in the hectic practice of litigation.
And we must also accept that litigation does not always produce results
consistent with the highest ideals to which one might aspire. Gay and
lesbian citizens still wait in most jurisdictions, for example, for an
equivalent to the Brown v. Board of Education ruling. It is not that
litigation has not occurred, but rather that litigation has produced, for a
variety of reasons, a less uniform set of protections for gays and lesbians
143
than other groups today enjoy.
141. For an outstanding treatment of these aspects of settlement's potential, see Seul,
supra note 8. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 4,

at 2669-70.
142. For example, each of the three Harvard professors most closely associated with ADR
in recent decades has made explicit the process pluralistic idea that settlement is one among
many possible processes. See, e.g., Roger Fisher & William Jackson, Acquiring the Tools of
ADR: Two Views, Teaching the Skills of Settlement, 46 SMU L. REv. 1985 (1993); Robert
H. Mnookin, When Not To Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist Reflects on Appropriate

Limits, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1077 (2003); Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg,
Fittingthe Forum to the Fuss: A User-FriendlyGuide To Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10
NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).

143. In some cases, of course, the avenue to justice does not run through the courthouse,
or at least does not initiate there. Legislative initiatives, popular ballots and referenda,
executive decisions, and administrative decisions can all lead to the expansion-or
erosion-of rights, as we have seen in recent years on the question of gay marriage.
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As with settlement, litigation's promise can be overstated. Litigation
exists as a possibility in virtually any dispute, but that does not mean that it
can legitimately claim to be an uber-process, providing everything to
everyone. For example, litigation virtually never enhances disputants'
relationships.
Litigation delivers little creativity, customization, or
confidentiality in most cases. 144 Litigation makes little space for emotions,
for narratives, or for deal-making. 145 Litigation's promise is rich and
admirable, and it is limited.
Articulating a vision of an idealized process can be helpful. My point in
this Part is not like the joke about the chemist, the physicist, and the
economist, stranded on a desert island with cans of food but no can opener.
The chemist proposes a method of using various indigenous compounds to
dissolve the cans' lids; the physicist proposes using tree branches and shells
to create enough leverage to crack the cans; and the economist proposes,
"First, assume we have a can opener." There is nothing wrong with
assuming away present conditions and constraints as a mechanism for
clarifying each process's ideals. Owen Fiss's collection of works, The Law
as It Could Be, is normative, rather than descriptive. 14 6 Proponents of
various forms of settlement have similarly written extensively about its
promise. 147 Each articulation of the ideal is surely useful. We must simply
remember that a description of an ideal is just that-an idealized picture,
rather than a description of a current reality. And we must remember that
settlement and litigation are necessarily limited in what they can deliver,
even in their idealized forms.

144. See Moffitt, supra note 55 (describing the limited contexts in which litigants have
the opportunity to customize their litigation experiences).
145. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1995) (exploring the role of narratives and emotions in
litigators' case theories); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principleand the Structure
of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 151 (2003) (singling out class actions as

exceptional because they are processes "not ultimately for adversarial litigation but for
dealmaking on a mass basis").
146. See generally OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE (2003). Fiss's essays sometimes
describe law as it once was, with the days of Brown v. Boardof Educationas the moment he
names as the judiciary's zenith. The essays sometimes describe law as it has not (yet?) been.
In either case, his essays are aspirational when read today.
147. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION:

RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION

24

(1994) (suggesting that transformative mediation would lead to "change or refinement in the
consciousness and character of individual human beings ... connot[ing] individual moral
development"); Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, IdeologicalProduction: The
Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 709, 710 (1988) (describing "three

analytically distinguishable projects within community mediation: the delivery of dispute
resolution services, social transformation, and personal growth," with clear links between
community justice and consensual justice); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11

NEGOTIATION J. 217, 236 (1995) (stating that mediation can lead to the "creation of more
human compassion, understanding, and moral decision making").
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C. Are We, in Law Schools, PreparingOur Students Appropriately To
Engage the Legal Landscape?

At the time he wrote Against Settlement, Fiss appears to have been

14 8
shocked at the growth of what he referred to as the ADR "movement."

He noted, for example, that it had already given rise to a professional

149
journal and to a section of the American Association of Law Schools.
The ten years prior to Against Settlement did, indeed, mark a phenomenal

growth period for academic initiatives aimed at promoting settlement.'

50

Following the Pound Conference, the publication of Getting to Yes brought

negotiation theory to the mainstream population.151 Howard Raiffa brought
negotiation theory more directly to the business community. 152 Carrie
Menkel-Meadow had begun what would become a prolific set of theoretical
contributions to the legal academy's understanding of conflict.1 53

Those

years also saw an explosion of ADR initiatives in practice, such that it is not
easy to say whether it was scholars or practitioners who were in the lead.
Law school curricula gradually began to reflect this changing landscape

as well. There is evidence of negotiation courses being offered at a law
school as early as the 1950s, 154 and a small minority of schools offered one
such course during the decades before the early 1980s. By the end of the

century, however, every accredited law school offered at least one course in
ADR. 155 Today, many schools offer multiple specialized courses. Some
law schools even offer LL.M. or Master's Degree programs in dispute
156

resolution.
These curricular changes track many of the recommendations of the most
prominent, recent examinations of modem legal education. The MacCrate
148. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1073.
149. Id. Despite my recent service as Chair of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) Section on Dispute Resolution, I can report that the section continues to thrive
today.
150. Ray, supra note 135, at 73.
151. Getting to Yes was originally published in 1981, and it is now in its second edition.
FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 41. As of 2005, it had sold more than five million copies
worldwide and has been translated into more than thirty languages. See Letter from Bruce
Patton to author (May 24, 2009) (on file with author).
152. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION:
BARGAINING FOR
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1982). Integrative bargaining soon saw even greater
inroads among business audiences with the publication of The Manager as Negotiator, LAX
& SEBENIUS, supra note 41.
153. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
154. See Robert E. Mathews, Negotiation: A Pedagogical Challenge, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC.
93 (1954); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a
Theory, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905, 908 (1983); James J. White, The Lawyer as a
Negotiator: An Adventure in Understandingand Teaching the Art of Negotiation, 19 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 337, 337-38 (1967).
155. See Michael Moffitt, Lights, Camera,Begin FinalExam: Testing What We Teach in
Negotiation Courses, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91 (2004).
156. Examples of such programs can be found at the University of Oregon, the University
of Missouri-Columbia, Pepperdine University, Creighton University, and Marquette
University.
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Report, for example, extols the merits of skills training, and specifically
highlights the need for "problem-solving," "communication," "counseling,"
and "negotiation." 1 57 The Carnegie Report faults law schools for providing
a "subordinate place ... [to] the practical legal skills, such as dealing with
clients and ethical-social development," and specifically encourages law
schools to teach students negotiation skills. 158 In many regards, these
"modern" recommendations are in no way new. Many decades earlier, for
example, Lon Fuller, one of the most prolific and thoughtful scholars of
legal education, argued that law schools should be teaching both the
analytic skills that one acquires through traditional Socratic instruction and
the negotiating and counseling skills that Derek Bok would later call "the
159
gentler arts."
Depending on the timeline one examines, the growth of ADR in law
schools can appear meteoric. In a few short decades, we have gone from
essentially nothing to having more than five hundred faculty selfidentifying as teachers of dispute resolution. 160 Does this trend suggest
that, within my lifetime, every law professor will be a professor of dispute
resolution? Clearly no. In fact, the data reveal a flattening of the number of
tenure-track law faculty teaching ADR during the past decade, compared
with earlier growth.161
As I explain in an article that will appear in the Ohio State Journal of
Dispute Resolution later this year, many law schools appear to be at a
crossroads with respect to the ways in which they teach dispute resolution
to future generations of lawyers. Some law schools today offer a handful of
stand-alone ADR courses, providing those students who are able to take the
courses with a set of skills aimed at improving settlements. Some law
schools today require at least a small amount of training in settlement skills,
much as they require training in legal research and writing. Some law
schools today seek to integrate dispute resolution into what are often called
"doctrinal" courses, a label commonly used to distinguish them from
"skills" courses. And some law schools today invest heavily in dispute

157. See generally ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM-REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992).
158. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 7 (2007),

available at http://www.camegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrarypdf_632.pdf. The report specifically highlights teaching negotiation in law schools. See id.
at 111-14.
159. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
570, 582-83 (1983); Robert S. Summers, Fulleron Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 8,
11-14 (1984).
160. The 2006-2007 AALS Directory of Law Teachers lists 569 law faculty who selfidentify as teaching dispute resolution. ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF
LAW TEACHERS 1176-81 (2006).

161. Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of ADR
in Law Schools, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (listing AALS

ADR membership in 1997-1998 (456), in 2002-2003 (510), and in 2007-2008 (569)).
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resolution, making it one of their prominent foci, with specialized programs
and extensive curricular and cocurricular offerings. 16 2 Given the existence
of each of these curricular approaches to dispute resolution, and given the
reluctance of the legal academy to make dramatic changes quickly, I doubt
that we will see any consolidation or agreement on a single approach
anytime soon.
Whatever imperialistic aims Fiss may have feared from the ADR
"movement," it appears that he can rest with some assurance that ADR's
expansion has slowed or even ceased. The legal academy may forever be
influenced by those who specialize in settlement, but the demise of
litigation's role in the law school curriculum has at least thus far been
greatly exaggerated. Law school instruction still revolves primarily around
the role of lawyers in litigation. The primary materials from which law
students typically learn remain appellate court decisions. Courses that teach
skills-for example, negotiating, counseling, drafting, deal-making, or
63
lobbying-remain the exception.
Perhaps the future of law school curricula will be one in which the line
between litigation-focused courses and settlement-skills-focused courses
will be blurred. Litigation and settlement are so intertwined in practice that
I would think it difficult to teach them as though they were distinct. Those
drafting a contract must think about what the litigation might look like
down the road, if one party believes the other has breached. Those engaged
in litigation must contemplate other avenues for satisfying the legitimate
interests of those involved in the dispute. Those contemplating settlement
must think about what litigation, or other nonsettlement alternatives, will
look like in the event no deal is reached. Skilled lawyering today demands
an understanding of all of these processes.
Just as I am for settlement and for litigation, I am for teaching future
lawyers about both.
CONCLUSION

Against Settlement deserves robust praise and gratitude from those who
care about settlement and about litigation. This essay helpfully suggested at
least three perspectives from which to examine each of those processes. It
focused attention on power imbalances and their potentially destructive
effects. It raised questions about the pitfalls of agency dynamics,
162. I describe each of these models in significantly greater detail in the article cited
immediately above, supra note 161.
163. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 47 ("The legal-case method, in all its
variations, has dominated the first year of most legal education through much of the past
century."); Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Casefor Another Case Method, 60 VAND.
L. REv. 597, 602 (2007) ("What [law students] most crucially lack . . . is the ability to
generate the multiple characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, and multiple
solutions, to which they could apply their very well honed analytic skills."). For an
interesting example of a "transactional lab" approach to teaching transactional lawyering
skills, see Robert C. Illig, The Oregon Method:
TransactionalLaw, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 221 (2009).

An Alternative Model for Teaching
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particularly in cases involving significant numbers of disputants. It
demanded that we wrestle with what it means for people to have access to
the court system and to the justice it promises. All three of these
perspectives remain at least as vital today as they were in 1984.
Against Settlement deserves robust opposition to the extent it suggests a
binary choice between settlement and litigation. If Fiss urges such a choice,
the question he poses is not merely a "Which of your children do you love
most?" kind of question. Instead, it is one for which neither answer could
possibly be adequate: "Which is better, food or water?" Perhaps it is a
misreading of Fiss to think that he demands a binary choice. Perhaps he
was merely urging us to dampen our enthusiasm for settlement, in the face
of what he perceived to be important shortcomings in its implementation at
that time and in that context. Certainly, many commentators have re-read
Fiss to be suggesting that we ought to be asking more nuanced questions.
Many, for example, have suggested that Fiss merely urges us to think hard
before necessarily embracing settlement in all cases. Such a thesis would
find many modem supporters, both among those whose primary focus is
litigation and among those whose primary focus is settlement. But the title
Fiss chose and the language he uses in his article make more nuanced
readings like these difficult. If Against Settlement means what its language
implies-that one could do away with settlement, retain litigation, and be
better off for the change-then the article's thesis is flawed both as a
theoretical and as a practical matter.
We should celebrate the beauty in each process's internal narrative of
justice, of truth, of efficiency, of predictability, and even of morality.
Proponents of settlement believe not merely in settlement's efficiency, but
also in its ability to bring justice, to discover truth(s), and to provide
stability. Proponents of litigation embrace the same values. We might
usefully engage the empirical question of whether one process or the other
does a better job of promoting each of these values. Both settlement and
litigation fail on each of these measures with some reliability, and both
processes continue to undergo reforms aimed at improving their
performances as measured by these values. But to characterize either as
unconcerned with any one of these values is simply false.
If we set out to compare settlement with litigation, we should do so
responsibly. We should compare the idealized vision of settlement with the
idealized vision of litigation. Or we should compare the sloppy reality of
settlement in practice with the sloppy reality of litigation in practice. But
more than anything, we should recognize that settlement and litigation are
no longer separate-in practice or in theory. Because settlement and
litigation are coevolved, symbiotic processes, to stand against one is to
stand against the other. I choose, instead, to be for litigation and for
settlement.

Notes & Observations

